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Abstract
Imagine a set of communication partners wants to keep their communi-
cation links secret. Consider the case where untrustworthy parties are able
to observe every communication, which implies not only that they can detect
the content of the communication, but also who is communicating and who
is listening. Using this information, the untrustworthy parties try to link
communicating parties. This, in a nutshell, is the problem of anonymous
and unlinkable communication in computer networks.
By use of encryption techniques the content of messages can be kept
private. However, the communication links can still be detected. Since the
addresses of sending and receiving parties are contained in the header of
every message sent over the network, an untrustworthy party needs only to
eavesdrop a single message of the communication in order to link sender and
receiver. Additional techniques have to be used to hide this information. We
address this problem in this thesis.
We define measures for anonymity and unlinkability that are based on
the information theoretic notion of entropy. These measures are used first to
evaluate different approaches for anonymous and unlinkable communication
and second, to show the effectiveness of attacks on these protocols.
We present existing techniques for anonymous and unlinkable commu-
nication and highlight weak points of these techniques by applying attacks
to them. In these attacks, known as traffic analysis attacks, the attacker
basically tries to collect as much information about the communication as
possible and then makes deductions concerning the communication links.
We show that these traffic analysis attacks are applicable to many existing
techniques. Furthermore, we introduce a new traffic analysis attack, namely
the slotted packet-counting attack.
Motivated by these findings, we present a protocol for unlinkable com-
munication in computer networks. We prove that this protocol leaks no
information on communication links in the case where attackers are able to
observe any communication in the network. By this means, the protocol
guarantees a user-defined degree of unlinkability. We also show that the pro-
tocol generates a minimal amount of extra messages for achieving a given
degree of receiver anonymity, i.e. where an attacker is not able to detect the
receiver of a message.
Contents
1 Introduction 5
1.1 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Overview of Dissertation Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Discussion on Significance of this Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Current Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Law and Legal Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 Quality Measures for Anonymous and Unlinkable Networks 15
2.1 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 Information Theoretic Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.2 Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.1.3 Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.1.4 Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.5 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Attacker Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.1 Passive Attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2.2 Active Attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 Anonymous and Unlinkable Networks - State of the Art 28
3.1 Proxy Based . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.1 Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.2 Mix Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.3 Onion Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Dining Cryptographers-Based Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4 Attacks on Anonymity Protocols 40
4.1 State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.1 Passive Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.2 Active Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 Slotted Packet-Counting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.2.2 Attack Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2.3 The Attack in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.3 Efficiency of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5 Unlinkable Communication 66
5.1 Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.1.1 Key-exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.1.2 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.1.3 Response Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.1.4 Path Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.2.1 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.2.2 Proof of Unlinkability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.3 Practical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.3.1 Application to Internet Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.3.2 Application to Ad Hoc Communication . . . . . . . . 87
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
6 Conclusion 90
6.1 Discussion and Critical Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
6.2 Further Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2
List of Figures
2.1 Entropy of a rectangular distributed set X . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Anonymity sets and degree of anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Unlinkability sets and degree of unlinkability . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Passive attacker of an anonymity system . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Active attacker of an anonymity system . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Using proxy server for unlinkable communication . . . . . . . 30
3.2 Example for Mix server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Cascade of Mixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Onion routing with 3 onion router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 DC-net group with shared keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1 Setup for clogging attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.2 Setup for (n-1)-Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4.3 Setup for watermarking attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4 Example for packet-counting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.5 Locating communication slots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.6 Setup for attacking Mixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.7 Setup for attacking Tor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.8 F-Measure of Mix scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.9 F-Measure of Tor scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.10 Correlation coefficient of nodes Si and Rj . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 Communication path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Performance of key-exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3 Performance of communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.4 Throughput during communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3
List of Tables
4.1 Communication partners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2 Likelihood for communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3 Received packet count by time slot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Packet count for receiving per time slot . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.5 Correlation coefficients of sender and receiver nodes . . . . . . 55
4.6 Influence of attacks on protocols for unlinkable communica-
tion with n users in networks with m nodes . . . . . . . . . . 64
4
Chapter 1
Introduction
IP-based communication is used in many different applications. We browse
the Internet for news, check the weather forecast or buy a new book at
Amazon. We keep in contact with friends or business partners via email,
social networks (Facebook, LinkedIn) or Internet telephony (Skype). And
finally we update our computer systems over the Internet, load new software
or share files online. The common advantage of these applications is that
they are fast, convenient and cheap or even free.
The danger of this is that user profiles can be created by combining the
information revealed during the use of the different applications. For example
an Internet service provider (ISP) is able to observe the communication of its
customers and might collect information on the web sites visited. Operators
of any website might be able to use cookies to track the communication
of users who visited this site. This information can be useful for targeted
advertising. The location of a device and its user might be detectable by
using geolocation techniques.
Most users do not know that personal information is collected and can be
mapped to their identity. Moreover, users often give away personal informa-
tion for small benefits, such as small discounts when using PayBack cards.
Users have two main ways of ensuring that no personal information is mis-
used. In most cases, privacy policies regulate the use of private information
by companies. But few users really read these policies; most assume that the
company is trustworthy. It is also hard to prove that companies follow these
policies. And even if the user can detect that a company misused private
information, it is hard to undo the misuse.
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The better choice is to only reveal as little private information as possi-
ble. By hiding all other information, the users can prevent this information
from being misused. While encrypting the communication can guarantee the
secrecy of the content communication links can also reveal information, for
example that a user has an account at Facebook.
This thesis is about anonymous and unlinkable communication in IP-
based networks. By using anonymous communication, i.e. where the sender
or the receiver cannot be detected, or unlinkable communication, i.e. where
no sender can be mapped to a receiver, the user can secure information on
communication links in order to preserve anonymity or unlinkability (defini-
tions see Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 gives the
problem statement of this thesis. The following Section 1.2 gives an overview
of the dissertations’ area of study. We show the significance of the study in
Section 1.3. The final Section 1.5 gives an overview of this thesis.
1.1 Problem Statement
In IP-based communication, the Internet service provider (ISP) assigns
unique IP addresses to its users when they connect to the network. When a
user A sends a messageM to a station B, the IP addresses of both are part of
M . For that reason, all stations that see message M know that the message
was sent by A and is addressed to B. Because in general, any two stations
on the Internet are not connected by a direct communication link, messages
normally travel over a series of stations from the sender A to the receiver
B. Consequently, at a minimum all the stations on the communication path
learn the IP addresses of A and B.
The mapping from the IP address to the user behind the IP address
is known only to the ISP. Therefore the ISP knows to whom A is sending
messages. But other parties might also be able to determine the sender and
receiver of a communication. In the European Union, the data retention law
instructs all member states to store the mapping of users to IP addresses
for at least six months for crime prevention and detection. This data can be
accessed by governmental institutions. Even if no direct mapping between
the user and the IP address is available, information on this mapping can be
gained by observing communication over time. If the user logs in to check
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email and later visits another website, the same IP address is used. Indeed,
tracking of communication processes over time is already achieved by using
cookies.
This information is collected for several reasons: Governmental institu-
tions collect information for crime prevention and detection. Private compa-
nies legally collect information for market research and advertising reasons.
Information may also be collected illegally for advertising, spying and extor-
tion.
The user is not normally able to prevent third parties from collecting
private information. However, in most cases policies regulate how this in-
formation is collected and how it is used. If the user does not agree to the
policy, he can decide to not use the service. Even if he accepts the policy
he cannot be sure whether the third party sticks to the policy and that the
data is kept secret. The problem is that, once private information has been
leaked, it is hard to make sure that all copies have been deleted.
The best way to prevent the misuse of private information is by not
giving this information to third parties unless it is really needed. The use
of encryption can hide the content of messages, but not the communicating
stations: the fact that two stations are communicating with each other also
reveals information. Anonymous or unlinkable communication can help to
hide this information.
This thesis is about how to guarantee anonymous and unlinkable com-
munication. In a communication setting there exist two kinds of anonymity:
Sender anonymity means that no third party is able to detect the sender of
a message, while receiver anonymity means that the receiver of a message is
not detectable. Unlinkability of sender and receiver is weaker; it says only
that the sender and receiver of a message cannot directly be linked. There
exist protocols that try to implement anonymity and unlinkability but all
suffer from security or scalability issues. In this thesis we present a new pro-
tocol for unlinkable communication that offers provable unlinkability. This
means that during the communication no information on the communication
link is revealed.
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1.2 Overview of Dissertation Study
As mentioned in the problem statement, the aim of this thesis is to guarantee
unlinkable communication in IP-based networks. The first step is to define
the terms unlinkability and anonymity, then based on these definitions, to
introduce measures for unlinkability and anonymity. These measures are
important to evaluate the quality of a protocol. On the one hand it is
possible to apply these measures to existing protocols, which are already
in use. On the other hand, if the best achievable degrees of unlinkability
and anonymity are known, new protocols can be optimized with regard to
these values. Optimization means first achieving the best possible degree of
unlinkability and anonymity, and second reducing the costs of reaching this
goal.
By applying these measures we first analyze existing work and outline
the weaknesses of the techniques applied. We try to exploit these weaknesses
from the attacker’s perspective in order to show that they can be used in
practice to break the unlinkability and anonymity of the existing protocols.
We apply the measures for anonymity and unlinkability and measure the
information that an attacker can obtain by observing the communication.
We try to implement a communication protocol that leaks no information on
the communication link, i.e. the mapping of sender and receiver of a message.
If this is the case, the attacker cannot break the protocol by means of passive
observations. The protocol achieves this by building a communication path
over different stations where the destination node is placed randomly on the
path. Furthermore, the protocol guarantees receiver anonymity in an optimal
way in terms of message overhead. We show how to apply the protocol
to Internet and ad hoc communication. Compared to existing works our
protocol is either more secure at similar costs (see proxy-based techniques in
Section 3.1) or is similar secure at better costs (see DC-net based techniques
in Section 3.2).
1.3 Discussion on Significance of this Work
This section first shows the motivation of different institutions for collecting
private information and the consumer’s incentives for providing that infor-
mation. The second part of this section gives an overview on regulations
8
concerning the protection of privacy and the collecting of personal informa-
tion.
1.3.1 Current Situation
It is often necessary to collect personal information before a service can be
provided. For example, contact and billing information is needed in order
to buy a book at Amazon. But companies are also interested in collecting
additional information from the customer. This information is used for mar-
ket analysis and targeted advertising. In the case of Amazon, if a customer
buys a product A, he later receives emails with recommendations for another
product B, if there are other customers who bought both products A and
B.
Many people publish private information on personal websites or in so-
cial networks, such as Facebook. Most of them are not aware that this infor-
mation can be used for undesired purposes. Companies comb through the
Internet to find information on job candidates. A risqué page on Facebook
can have negative effects on finding a job.
Companies try to collect contact information by offering small discounts
(PayBack) or free raﬄes. Also people often forget to make a tick on a form
that says that the personal information given must not be used for marketing
purposes. The main problem of giving away information is that it is hard to
make sure that the information is only used as agreed, and subsequently to
delete it, if desired. Old versions of websites may even still be available via
services such as [1], so that deleted content of websites can still be accessed.
In other cases, the users of a service are not aware that private informa-
tion is being collected. The business model of Google is based on advertising.
Companies only pay for the advertising if people visit their web site over a
link from Google. For that reason, Google tries to place advertising that
might be interesting for the user of Google. In order to do this, Google
collects information on search requests and web sites visited. Tracking of
users is also used for billing reasons: the companies pay per click on the
advertising.
The type of private information that may be stored and the purpose for
which it may be used is regulated in privacy policies. Section 1.3.2 gives
more details on this topic. But even if the user agrees to the privacy policy,
he cannot be sure that the company will follow the rules. And even if the
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company follows the rules, it might be possible that the information is not
adequately secured, or that information is leaked by employees. This hap-
pened, for example, at Deutsche Telekom, where employees sold information
on customers in 2006 [2], and also at the LGT Bank in Liechtenstein (see
[3]), where leaked customer information was used to detect tax fraud. In
the UK personal information on UK citizens is being lost in unprecedented
rate. In 2008 millions of addresses, bank account details, and private health
information was stolen or lost [4].
In IP-based communication, when users do not directly offer private in-
formation, companies or public institutions have good chance of collecting
enough data from different sources to assemble the wanted information, such
as websites visited and mails sent. Encrypting the communication reduces
the information that can be read by third parties but information on the
communication partners is still visible. Additional techniques have to be
applied to hide this information. The most popular way to hide the com-
munication link is called onion routing. Details on onion routing will be
presented in Chapter 3. Successful attacks on this and other protocols show
that more investigations in this area are required.
1.3.2 Law and Legal Issues
In addition to being covered by contract law as it applies to organisations’
privacy policies, privacy protection and data retention is regulated in the
European Union. Basically, the privacy protection law represents the inter-
ests of consumers by giving rules on how private data may be processed. In
contrast, the data retention law each member of the European Union man-
dates the storage of connection data for all electronic communications, such
as telephony and Internet communication. The following gives more details
on these regulations.
Privacy
Privacy protection means the protection of personal data from misuse. In
the European Union it is regulated in the convention [5]:
The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of
each [member state] for every individual, whatever his nationality
or residence, respect for his rights and fundamental freedoms,
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and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to automatic
processing of personal data relating to him ("data protection").
The convention also says that personal data may only be stored for as long
as it is needed. For example, accounting information has to be deleted after a
given period of time. Additional to this, the convention [5] says that personal
data of an individual can be used in the interest of “State security, public
safety, the monetary interests of the State or the suppression of criminal
offences”, in the interest of the individual or the rights and freedoms of
others.
Personal data can be used for research purposes if there is no risk of
infringement of privacy. In all other cases, the convention says that each
individual can decide whether, by whom and when his personal data should
be accessible by other parties. Privacy policies give information on what data
is collected, for what reason the data is collected, how the data is secured
and with whom the data may be shared. More details on privacy policies
can be found in Section 2.1.4. Anonymous and unlinkable communication
can help to keep personal information secret.
Data Retention
The term ‘data retention’ means the obligation on service providers to store
information concerning electronic communications without initial suspicion.
Directive 2006/24/EG [6] of the European Parliament regulates data reten-
tion within the European Union. In the directive it is stated that data
on electronic communication has to be stored for the purpose of investiga-
tion, detection and prosecution of serious crime. The member states have to
guarantee that this data is retained at least six months up to maximally two
years. This data may be provided to national authorities only in accordance
with national law.
For every communication type, the directive gives rules on which data
has to be stored. For phone calls, the numbers of the calling and called party,
the duration and the date of the call have to be stored. For mobile phones
additionally the cell where the device is connected, the IMEI (International
Mobile Equipment Identity) with which a mobile device can uniquely be
identified, and for anonymous SIM-cards also the date of the date of the first
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use, have to be stored. These regulations are also valid for services such as
SMS (short message service) or MMS (multimedia messaging service).
For VoIP communication similar regulations exist. To identify the com-
munication partner the IP address, name and address of the caller, the date
and time of the call and the duration of the call have to be stored.
In electronic mail systems both the sending and receiving of messages has
to be tracked. While sending a message the IP address and the username of
the mailbox of the sender are stored. Additionally all other email addresses
involved, such as the receiver email address, and the date and time of sending
are stored. When receiving email information, the IP address of the receiving
user and the username of the mailbox, as well as the email addresses of all
involved users, the IP address of the sending mail server and the date and
time when the user connects to the receiving mail server are stored.
For all other Internet communication, only the mapping of the IP ad-
dress to a user identity (name and address) at any point in time has to be
guaranteed. This means that no information is collected on which websites
a user visited or which services, other than messaging and VoIP, he used.
The directive gives no rules on how this data has to be retained. There
exist different approaches for the data retention: The British government
plans to build a central database which is filled with records from Internet
service providers and telecoms companies. The data will be stored for 12
months and shall be accessible only with permission from the courts. The
disadvantage of this solution is that a central database would be a greater
risk for attacks and abuse. In fact there have been numerous incidents, where
private information was lost by governmental institutions (see for example
[7]).
In Germany providers for telecommunication and Internet access are
forced to store the data for at least six months and maximally seven months.
But there is a considerable debate on this. Besides the problem of addi-
tional costs for storing the necessary information, it is also not clear if these
companies are able to guarantee that personal information is adequately se-
cured. The loss of personal information of 17 million customers of Deutsche
Telekom in 2006 is an evidence that this is not the case [2]. In this incident
data sets of customers were copied by employees of Deutsche Telekom and
sold to various companies. These data sets are still on the market. As a con-
sequence of this breach of privacy Klaus Jansen, the head of the BDK (Bund
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Deutscher Kriminalbeamter), said that personal customer data should not
be stored by private companies. He recommends a central data base main-
tained by the government and under supervision of data protection officers
[8] as is planned in Great Britain.
Besides the problem that data retention is an attack on privacy and
introduces the danger of misuse, it is also possible to bypass data retention.
Mail servers outside the European Union do not need to store connection
data of their users. Direct communication tracking of web traffic is also
not possible, because only the mappings of IP addresses to their users are
logged. Further investigations have to be made in order to know if someone
contacted a server.
1.4 Contributions
The main parts of this thesis are published by the author. We introduced
measures for unlinkability and anonymity in Chapter 2.1. The measure for
anonymity was introduced by [9] and [10] while the measure for unlinkability
was introduces by us in [11].
The slotted packet counting attack presented in Chapter 4 was published
in [12]. It mainly improves traditional packet counting attacks by taking
account to the alteration of traffic load. We showed how to apply this attack
to different scenarios by optimizing the parameters of the attack.
In Chapter 5 we present a protocol for unlinkable communication. The
core of the protocol and parts of the evaluation are published in [11]. Exten-
sions for applying it to mobile ad hoc networks are published in [13, 14, 15],
where [14] was awarded with the ‘Best student paper awardť at the Aus-
tralasian Information Security Conference 2008.
Furthermore the author of this thesis was co-author of several publica-
tions in the area of trust [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. Applying
these techniques to anonymous and unlinkable communication is planned.
1.5 Overview
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we introduce qual-
ity measures for evaluating protocols for anonymous and unlinkable commu-
nication. To do this, we define anonymity and unlinkability and introduce
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measures for both, and also for performance. We also introduce the attacker
model, which influences the degree of anonymity and unlinkability.
The following Chapter 3 presents existing protocols for anonymous and
unlinkable communication. We divide the protocols in two categories: Proxy-
based and dining cryptographers-based approaches. In the first case, mes-
sages are sent via other stations in order to confuse an observer of the com-
munication. The anonymity and unlinkability in the dining cryptographers
protocol is based on superposed sending and broadcasting messages.
Attacks on protocols for anonymous and unlinkable communication are
presented in Chapter 4. The attacker either tries to infer communication
links by passively observing the network traffic, or by actively manipulating
the network traffic or a part of the system. Section 4.2 introduces a new
passive attack, which improves traditional packet-counting attacks.
We introduce the new protocol for unlinkable communication in Chapter
5. We first introduce the protocol, followed by an analysis of performance
and unlinkability. Section 5.3 shows how the protocol can be applied in
different network scenarios.
The final Chapter 6 contains a critical assessment of the thesis. Section
6.2 gives directions for further studies.
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Chapter 2
Quality Measures for
Anonymous and Unlinkable
Networks
To evaluate different systems we need a measure that expresses quality. By
such a measure we can not only evaluate, but also improve and aid under-
standing of systems. For this purpose we introduce measures for anonymity
and unlinkability that are based on the information theoretic notion of en-
tropy. We will use these measures throughout this thesis to evaluate various
anonymity systems. Also, the measure makes it possible to measure the
influence of attacks on the degree of anonymity and unlinkability.
The degrees of anonymity and unlinkability depend not only on the tech-
nique applied by the user, but also on the capabilities of the attacker. There-
fore, we define two different types of attacker, for use in this thesis: Passive
attackers try to find communication links only by passively observing net-
work traffic, while active attackers are additionally able to manipulate traffic
and might be able to take over subsets of the users and parts of the system.
This chapter is organized as follows: In the first Section 2.1 we introduce
the information theoretic notion of entropy, also known as uncertainty. We
will use entropy to measure anonymity and unlinkability. The term privacy
is often used synonymously to anonymity and unlinkability. We introduce
the definition of privacy in order to clarify the difference. The performance
measures will also be used in this thesis for evaluating protocols for unlinkable
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and anonymous communication. Section 2.2 introduces the attacker model.
We define two different types of attackers: passive and active attackers.
2.1 Measures
A measure in mathematics (see [26]) is defined for a σ-algebra X which is a
special kind of collection of sets. It is a function µ that maps to every set
s ∈ X a real value µ(s) ∈ [0,∞], where the empty set is mapped to 0. Ad-
ditionally, the measure is countable additive, also called σ-additive. It can
be used for quantifying different kinds of sets, e.g. lengths or volumes. We
introduce measures for anonymity and unlinkability, which may then be used
for evaluation. The measures give an understandable and reproducible no-
tion for these terms. The approach to measure anonymity and unlinkability
used in this thesis is based on the information theoretic notion of entropy.
2.1.1 Information Theoretic Measures
Information theory introduces the notions of information and entropy. De-
tailed information can be found in [27, 28]. Information theory concerns the
observation of events and reasoning about other events. For example, in a
communication system, the receiver tries to reason about the signal sent by
observing the signal received. Therefore information is defined as a function
of two variables: the observable event y ∈ Y and the event x ∈ X one wants
to reason about, where X and Y are random variables.
Definition 1. The information one receives concerning x ∈ X while observ-
ing an event y ∈ Y is denoted by IX,Y (x; y). It is defined by:
IX,Y (x; y)
def
= log2
PX|Y (x|y)
PX(x)
, (2.1)
under the assumption that PX(x) 6= 0 and PY (y) 6= 0. This is known as the
mutual information of x and y.
Information is measured in bits. The measure gives the minimal number
of bits used to represent the information. IX,Y (x; y) is symmetric in the
arguments x and y. It reaches its minimum, −∞, in the case of PX|Y (x|y) =
0 and its maximum, − log2 PX(x), in the case of PX|Y (x|y) = 1. A value of
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0 means that the events x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are independent. It follows that
the values for IX,Y (x; y) are in the following interval:
−∞ ≤ IX,Y (x; y) ≤ − log2 PX(x). (2.2)
The above definition is for any two events. With the following definition
for I(X;Y ) we can measure the mean information conveyed by two random
variables.
Definition 2. I(X;Y ) is defined by:
I(X;Y )
def
= IX,Y (x; y) =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
PX,Y (x, y) log2
PX|Y (x|y)
PX(x)
(2.3)
It is known as the mutual information of X and Y .
The self-information of an event x ∈ X is the amount of information
that is needed to uniquely identify it:
IX,X(x;x) = − log2 PX(x). (2.4)
We can define the mean self information of a random variable in the same
way as for the mutual information. It is denoted by H(X).
Definition 3. H(X) is defined by:
H(X)
def
= IX,X(x;x) = −
∑
x∈X
PX(x) · log2 PX(x) (2.5)
It is known as the entropy or uncertainty of a random variable X.
We assume that 0 · log2 0 = 0, so that in cases where PX(x) = 0 the
entropy and mutual information are well-defined. The maximum of log2 n
is reached when the random variable X = {x1, · · · , xn} has a rectangular
distribution. The entropy reaches its minimum, 0, when the probability of
one element xi ∈ X is 1 .
The entropy of a random variable X gives the maximum amount of in-
formation that can be inferred through observation. It depends only on the
probabilities of the containing elements x ∈ X. Figure 2.1 shows the entropy
of a rectangularly distributed random variable. The number of elements of
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Figure 2.1: Entropy of a rectangular distributed set X
the random variable varies from 1 to 1024, while the entropy attains values
from 0 to 10.
Entropy will be used throughout the thesis for the measurement of an-
onymity and unlinkability. Mutual information aids in the quantification
of the amount of information that is revealed during different attacks on
anonymity systems.
2.1.2 Anonymity
The word anonymous is derived from Greek and has the meaning ‘nameless’,
‘of unknown name’, ‘wanting a name’ [29]. We will use the commonly-used
definition of Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [30], that is more general:
Definition 4. Anonymity of a subject means that the subject is not identi-
fiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set.
The definition makes it clear that anonymity is a property that cannot be
achieved by one subject itself, in contrast to for instance confidentiality. To
be anonymous, a subject needs other subjects in order to hide its identity in
the corresponding anonymity set. Anonymity depends on the point of view:
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If a person has enough knowledge to identify the subject of interest, then
apparently this subject is not anonymous in this person’s perspective. On
the other hand, if there is a second person that has less knowledge making
him unable to identify the same subject of interest, then, from the second
person’s perspective, the subject is anonymous. For example, suppose the
sender of a message knows the receiver of the message but uses a protocol
that makes it impossible for an outsider to detect the receiver of messages.
In this case, the receiver is not anonymous to the sender but is to outsiders.
Anonymity is always related to an action. In the case of sender ano-
nymity with the sender anonymity set it is related to sending a message.
In the same way, for receiving messages, we have receiver anonymity with
the receiver anonymity set. The anonymity set consists of all subjects that
might have performed an action of interest. In the case of sender anonymity,
the anonymity set consists of all nodes that might have sent a message of
interest.
According to the definition, a subject is anonymous if it is not identifiable
within a set of subjects. However, this definition makes no statement on the
quality of anonymity. A subject is anonymous if the anonymity set consists
of at least two members. Nevertheless, a bigger anonymity set complicates
attacks on the anonymity system. This means that it is harder to reveal an
acting subject with the help of statistical attacks when the corresponding an-
onymity set is larger. In order to evaluate anonymity systems, we introduce
a measure for anonymity in the following section.
Measuring Anonymity
The measure for anonymity introduced in this section is based on an in-
formation theoretic approach. We define the degree of anonymity as the
entropy associated with a subject. Entropy as a measure for anonymity was
also proposed independently in [9] and [10]. In the case of sender anonymity,
the degree of anonymity gives the number of bits that is needed to iden-
tify the sender node. By using this approach, not only does the size of the
anonymity set influence the degree of anonymity, but also the probability
distribution over all members of the anonymity set. As result it is possible
that, even with a large anonymity set, the degree of anonymity is poor. In
the example of sender anonymity, this can be the case if one sender sent
the message with high probability, while the probability assigned to the rest
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Figure 2.2: Anonymity sets and degree of anonymity
of the possible sender nodes is small. This can happen if the attacker per-
forms traffic analysis attacks, where he observes the network traffic over an
extended period of time and statistically analyses the captured traffic data.
Additionally, a-priori information can influence the probabilities assigned to
the members of the anonymity set.
It is assumed that the anonymity set is given by A = {a1, · · · , an},
where ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ n are the subjects of the anonymity set. Let E(A) =
{e(a1), · · · , e(an)} the event set of A where an event e(ai) means ‘ai is the
subject of interest’.
Definition 5. The degree of anonymity of an anonymity set
A = {a1, · · · , an} is defined by:
dA
def
= H(E(A)) = −
∑
e(ai)∈Ae
P (e(ai)) log2 P (e(ai)). (2.6)
As seen in Section 2.1.1, the degree of anonymity is bounded by:
0 ≤ dA ≤ log2 n. (2.7)
In the case of 0, it is guaranteed that there is no anonymity: the attacker
has all information to identify the subject of interest. The maximum value
of log2 n is reached when all members of the anonymity set are equally likely
to be the originator of the action. Figure 2.2 shows the influence of the size
of the anonymity set on the degree of anonymity under the assumption that
A has a rectangular distribution.
This definition shows the two ways of improving anonymity. We can
increase the degree of anonymity by increasing the size of the anonymity set,
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or by equalizing the probabilities assigned to the members of the anonymity
set.
The assigned probabilities may vary with the point of view. For exam-
ple, if an attacker has only incomplete knowledge of the network traffic, he
might assign different probabilities compared to an attacker that has absolute
knowledge of the network. Thus, the degree of anonymity depends not only
on the anonymity system used and its parameters, but also on the attacker.
For an objective evaluation we have to define the network parameters, the
capabilities of the attacker and the previous knowledge of the attacker that
helps to break the anonymity. Details of the attacker model are given in
Section 2.2.
2.1.3 Unlinkability
We will use a definition of unlinkability introduced by Pfitzmann Köhntopp
in [30]:
Definition 6. Unlinkability of two or more items of interest from an at-
tacker’s perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently distinguish
whether these items of interest are related or not.
In our work we concentrate on the term unlinkability in the context of
network communication, i.e. sender and receiver unlinkability. That means
that the attacker is not able to link the sender and the receiver of a mes-
sage. In the same way as anonymity, unlinkability depends on the point of
view. Two persons might make different judgments on the unlinkability of
two items. Note that for unlinkability it is not necessary that the sender
and receiver are anonymous. A pair of sender and receiver nodes can be
unlinkable even if both the sending of a message at sender side and the re-
ceiving of a message at receiver side can be detected. This is, for example,
the case in Mix systems, as we will see later in this thesis (see Section 5). On
the other hand, unlinkability is necessary for anonymity. If the attacker can
map a sender to the respective receiver, no sender and receiver anonymity
can be guaranteed. Therefore, unlinkability is necessary but not sufficient
for anonymity.
In the same way that we defined anonymity sets we can also define un-
linkability sets. These sets consist of all combinations of sender and receiver
nodes. For example if the attacker is able to reduce the number of possible
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Figure 2.3: Unlinkability sets and degree of unlinkability
sending nodes to three and the number of possible receiver nodes to four,
the resulting unlinkability set consists of 12 elements. Figure 2.3 shows two
different unlinkability sets; the left set with nine elements and the right set
with only two elements. It is harder for an attacker to detect the communi-
cation link if the unlinkability set is bigger. As with anonymity this is not
the only criterion. In the following subsection we introduce a measure for
unlinkability that takes the size of the unlinkability set into account.
Measuring Unlinkability
In this section we introduce a measure for evaluating unlinkability in the
context of network communication. We introduced the measure in [11]. The
measure is similar to that of anonymity that is based on the notion of en-
tropy (see Section 2.1.2). We define the set of possible sender nodes as
S = {s1, · · · , sn} and the set of possible receiver nodes as R = {r1, · · · , rm}.
We denote the communication link where si sent a message to rj with the no-
tation li,j . The set of all possible communication links is L = {l1,1, · · · , ln,m}.
Let E(L) = {e(l1,1), · · · , e(ln,m)} be the event set of L where an event li,j
stands for ‘there exists a communication link between si and rj ’.
Definition 7. The degree of unlinkability for an unlinkability set L =
{l1,1, · · · , ln,m} is defined by:
dL
def
= H(E(L)) = −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
P (e(li,j)) log2 P (e(li,j)). (2.8)
22
We see that the degree of unlinkability depends on the size of the unlink-
ability set and the probabilities of the possible communication links. The
attacker might be able to adjust the probabilities by use of a-priori informa-
tion or by use of statistical analysis of the network traffic. We can increase
the degree of unlinkability by increasing the size of the unlinkability set, or
by equalizing the probabilities of the possible communication links.
For a fixed size of the unlinkability set, the best case is attained if the
probabilities of the communication links have a rectangular distribution. In
the example of Figure 2.3, the degree of unlinkability for the right setting
with only 2 links is 1, under the assumption that the links have a rectangular
distribution. For the left setting, the degree increases to log2 9. In the worst
case, the degree reaches its minimum of 0. This is the case when the attacker
has a proof for the link between the sender and receiver node. Therefore,
the bounds for the degree of unlinkability are:
0 ≤ dl ≤ log2 |L|. (2.9)
In the same manner as for anonymity, it holds that, when evaluating
systems that provide unlinkability, we have to define the capabilities and
knowledge of the attacker because these parameters also influence the degree
of unlinkability. We provide details of the attacker model in Section 2.2.
2.1.4 Privacy
In this section we define the differences between privacy and anonymity. The
terms privacy and anonymity are often used synonymously. In this thesis
we distinguish between these notions. While anonymity, as we have seen
in Section 2.1.2, means that a subject is not identifiable in an anonymity
set, privacy means that the subject is able to reveal personal information
selectively. Consequently, privacy is a weaker criterion than anonymity. Pri-
vacy implies that the subject decides which information he wants to reveal
and who has access to the revealed information. In order to avoid misuse,
it is useful to reveal as little information as possible. Personal information
can be the basis of discrimination: some insurance companies or provider
exclude persons because they belong to risk groups (see e.g. [31]). An ex-
ample for privacy is that of patient confidentiality, where information on a
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subject’s health is revealed. Access to this health information is limited to
the physicians involved.
Privacy is usually enforced by privacy policies. Privacy policies are rules
which are introduced by organizations in order to ensure the privacy of their
customers. Such policies focus on personal data. They give information on:
• How the data is collected
• What data is collected
• Intended use of the data
• Under which conditions the data is passed to third parties
• Application of the policy and procedure for handling complaints.
These policies are published, for example on the web site of the organi-
zation. As a case in point, in the European Union, web site providers have
to inform their users on privacy issues. The problem of privacy policies is
that it is hard to verify whether the policies are fulfilled. In the end, the
user has to trust that the organization follows the policies. This is the main
difference from anonymity and unlinkability. If a user communicates in an
anonymous or unlinkable manner, the organizations involved are not able to
obtain any personal information. Therefore, no trust in these organizations
is required.
2.1.5 Performance
In order to use a protocol for unlinkable or anonymous communication in
practice, it must not be efficiently breakable. On the other hand, the perfor-
mance of the protocol has to be acceptable. For measuring the performance
of communication protocols in this thesis we use the throughput together
with the related message overhead and the delay of messages.
The throughput is the average rate of successfully delivered messages.
It is measured in bits per second. In the case where the packet length is
constant it can be measured in packets per time interval.
The delay during a communication is the average time needed to send a
packet from the source to the destination, i.e. the time between sending a
message at the source node S and receiving this message at the destination
node D.
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In this thesis we measure the throughput and the delay in absolute values
with the help of a prototype implementation of the presented protocol. We
evaluate the related work by comparing the throughput and delay of the
network and the communication link while using the protocol of interest,
compared to the delay and throughput of the network without using the
protocol.
2.2 Attacker Model
It is important for the evaluation of anonymity systems to define the capa-
bilities of the attacker. With one attacker model, a system might be secure,
while the same system with the same parameters is insecure when assuming
a different attacker model. The attacker model gives information on the ca-
pabilities of an attacker and additional knowledge. In general, we assume,
as in [32] (Shannon’s maxim) and in [33] (Kerckhoffs’ principle), that the
attacker knows the system that is used for providing anonymity, and un-
linkability respectively. This includes the knowledge of the algorithms used,
e.g. for encryption, but not the private keys of the members of the network.
In our attacker model, the computational power and storage is bounded, so
that the attacker is not able to break cryptographic functions. There are two
basic attacker models that differ in their capabilities: passive attackers and
active attackers. The following subsection will discuss these basic models
in more detail. For the evaluation of anonymity and unlinkability systems,
this thesis assumes the strong passive attacker model. The impact of active
attacks on protocols for anonymous and unlinkable communication will also
be discussed.
2.2.1 Passive Attacker
In this thesis we assume the strongest passive attacker that is defined as
follows.
Definition 8. A passive attacker is able to observe every sending and receiv-
ing event in the network and he is able to see the content of the all packets
sent and received.
The setup of an passive attack is shown in Figure 2.4. There are two
main reasons for this approach: First, it is easier to compare and evaluate the
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results of different systems. Second, if a system successfully works under the
assumption of this attacker model, it will also work with a weaker attacker
model. This attacker model is often used in literature (e.g. [34]). These
capabilities are sufficient to perform traffic analysis attacks. In these attacks
the attacker tries to perform statistical analysis on captured traffic in order
to reveal the communicating nodes. Section 4.1.1 shows this kind of attack
in more detail. This attacker model will be used for evaluating the proposed
protocol for unlinkable communication.
2.2.2 Active Attacker
In addition to the capabilities of a passive attacker, an active attacker has
the following capabilities.
Definition 9. Additionally to the capabilities of a passive attacker an active
attacker is able to actively manipulate messages or the system. An attacker
who is able to inject, alter, and block messages is known as Dolev-Yao at-
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tacker [35, 36]. Additionally, an active attacker might be able to take over
some of the system’s users and also parts of the system itself.
The setup of an active attack is shown in Figure 2.5. The effectiveness
of such attacks is increased by the collaboration of several active attackers.
In most cases the attacker uses active manipulations to cause situations in
which passive attacks are more powerful. In Section 4.1.2 of this thesis, active
attacks on anonymity systems are introduced. We will show the influence of
active attackers on the protocol proposed in Section 5.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced anonymity, unlinkability and performance mea-
sures. The degrees of anonymity and unlinkability depend not only on the
protocols, which are used to guarantee anonymity and unlinkability, but
also on the capabilities of the attacker. Therefore, we also defined the ca-
pabilities of the attacker in this chapter. We introduced two different kinds
of attacker: Passive attackers are able only to observe the network traffic.
From the captured information, the attacker can reason about communica-
tion links. Active attackers are additionally able to manipulate traffic and
might be able to take over parts of the system and subsets of the users.
For the evaluation of the protocol presented for unlinkable communica-
tion (see Chapter 5) we will assume a global passive attacker, i.e. an attacker
that is able to observe every communication in the network. Using the infor-
mation theoretic notion of entropy we can show that, during the execution
of the protocol, no information on the communication links is revealed.
A global passive attacker is also assumed for the slotted packet counting
attack, which is presented in Section 4.2. Attackers that have only incom-
plete knowledge of the network traffic also have a good chance of revealing
communication links. In Chapter 4 we present another attack, where the
attacker actively manipulates traffic. A table at the end of Chapter 4 shows
the influence of attacks on the degree of anonymity and unlinkability while
using the protocols introduced in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Anonymous and Unlinkable
Networks - State of the Art
Research in the area of unlinkable and anonymous communication started
in 1981 with the concept of Mixes by Chaum [37]. Detailed information will
follow in Section 3.1.2 of this chapter. This approach was only considered
for the use in electronic mail systems. In this setting, Mixes are able to offer
unlinkability and, as long as all other users of the Mix and the Mix itself
are trustworthy, the attacker has no chance of breaking the unlinkability.
This technique was later applied to more general communication settings.
However, in these settings it cannot be guaranteed that the attacker infers
no information from passive observation of the incoming and outgoing links
of a Mix. A second drawback of traditional Mixes is that they introduce some
delay in forwarding packets. This small delay does not matter for sending
mails. In other settings, such as web browsing, these delays are not tolerable.
The basic idea of Mixes is adapted in a number of manners to overcome the
problem with the delays. Among these, the most popular technique is Tor
(see Section 3.1.3), which may be described as a low-latency Mix. In essence,
the mixing step is removed in order to reduce delays.
A second means of achieving unlinkability and anonymity is the dining
cryptographers’ network, also introduced by Chaum [38]. In this technique,
the users build groups in which they can send and receive messages anony-
mously. Sender anonymity is guaranteed by superposed sending, and receiver
anonymity by broadcasting all messages within the group. In theory, this
technique offers unbreakable unlinkability and also sender and receiver ano-
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nymity. However, there are several weak points in the protocol, which can
be exploited by an active attacker. The second drawback of this approach is
its poor scalability. Because of the superposed sending and the broadcasts,
the message overhead increases quadratically with the size of the anonymity
set. This illustrates the basic problem of most techniques: increased security
comes at the cost of performance and vice versa.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 in-
troduces proxy-based approaches for the implementation of unlinkable and
anonymous communication. These approaches have in common that the
traffic is channeled through other stations before it reaches the receiver, see
e.g. Mixes. The second approach will be presented in the following Section
3.2, which is based on the dining cryptographers’ network.
3.1 Proxy Based
The idea of the first systems which were built to offer unlinkability, was to
route traffic over intermediate nodes, such as proxy servers. The common
weakness of these systems is that a strong passive attacker, as assumed in
Section 2.2, is able to determine the sender and the receiver of a commu-
nication. Due to this fact, he is able to perform statistical analysis on the
network traffic, as we will see in Chapter 4. In the following, we will de-
scribe the evolution of proxy-based systems, starting with a simple proxy
server and ending up with Mix networks and onion routing.
3.1.1 Proxies
A proxy server is a device in the network that passes the requests of its users
to their destinations (see [39]). Thus, if a user A wants to contact B, it
sends its request to the proxy server P and P forwards the request to B. All
messages from B to A are also passed over the proxy (see Figure 3.1). As
result, node B has no direct contact with A and therefore does not need to
know the identity of A. The only contact address for B is the address of the
proxy server P . Only P and A know the end-points of the communication.
This simple solution is able to hide the sending node from the receiving
node, and the traffic overhead is small. On the other hand, the users have
to trust the proxy, because it is a single point of failure. Failure affects
not only service availability, which can be broken by heavy load or by de-
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Figure 3.1: Using proxy server for unlinkable communication
nial of service attacks, but also security. A proxy knows the communication
links and is therefore able to reveal this information to third parties. To
weaken this threat, the user can build paths over several proxies. In this
case the communication links can only be revealed if all proxy servers on the
path cooperate in a malicious manner. Such an increase in security comes
at the cost of performance: due to longer communication paths, the delay
while sending messages and the amount of packets sent increases. Even with
longer communication paths, the sending and receiving nodes of a commu-
nication are still visible to a strong passive attacker. The attacker can use
this information to perform statistical attacks.
The throughput while using proxies depends mainly on the bandwidth
of the proxies. When several users use one proxy, they have to share its
bandwidth, with a consequent decrease in the throughput of every commu-
nication. The delay of a proxy depends mainly on its computational power.
In the best case, the delay linearly increases with the number of proxies on
the communication path.
3.1.2 Mix Networks
Mixes were introduced by Chaum [37] in order to offer untraceable electronic
mail. To send a message to a destination node using a Mix, the sender first
has to encrypt the message together with the address of the destination node.
In [37] Chaum proposes the use of asymmetric encryption, but solutions with
more efficient symmetric encryption are also possible. In a Mix round, the
Mix server waits until it has received n encrypted messages, where n is
fixed. It decrypts these messages and sends the messages reordered, e.g.
sorted lexicographically, to the destination nodes. In the case of asymmetric
encryption, additional random bits must be added to the encrypted message.
If the messages sent to the Mix do not contain random bits, the attacker is
able to link the incoming to the outgoing traffic by re-encrypting forwarded
messages with the public key of the Mix. The view of a passive attacker is
shown in Figure 3.2.
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For the return communication, Chaum proposes the use of untraceable
return addresses, which are constructed by the source node and sent to the
destination node.
In the following, we show by example the functionality of a Mix. Figure
3.2 shows a Mix server with inputs from nodes N1, N2, N3 and outputs to
N4, N5, N6. Assume, that the Mix owns a pair of public and secret keys
PKMix and SKMix. N1 wants to send message M1 to N5, N2 wants to send
M2 to N4 and N3 wants to send M3 to N6. To do this, N1, N2 and N3 build
the following messages and send them to the Mix:
N1 →Mix : [M1, Random1]PKMix
N2 →Mix : [M2, Random2]PKMix
N2 →Mix : [M3, Random3]PKMix
The Mix server receives the messages and decrypts them with its private key
SKMix. Afterwards, it sends the following messages in lexicographical order
to the receiver nodes:
Mix→ N4 : M2
Mix→ N5 : M1
Mix→ N6 : M3
If N1 wants to receive a reply from N5 it can generate an untraceable
return address by choosing a one-time key Random4, which also serves as a
random string, its address A1 and a newly generated public key PK1. The
untraceable return address is as follows:
[A1, Random4]PKMix , PK1
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N1 sends this return address as a message over the Mix to the receiver
N5. N5 also generates a random string Random5 and sends its reply back
to N1 as follows:
N5 →Mix : [A1, Random4]PKMix , [M5, Random5]PK1
Mix→ N1 : A1, [[M5, Random5]PK1 ]Random4
It is also possible to build cascades of Mixes (see Figure 3.3). Sending and
receiving of messages work in the same way, as with a single Mix. The nec-
essary encryption is applied recursively for every Mix on the communication
path.
In order to avoid the easy revelation of communication links by message
replay, the Mix has to check that none of the incoming messages has been
already processed. The encryption of a replayed message would be the same
as that of the original message. By intersecting outgoing links of two Mix
rounds in which the same messages appear, the attacker can link the source
and the destination.
Because this kind of Mix has to wait until it received n messages in a
round, the delay becomes arbitrarily long in the worst case. On the other
hand, the unlinkability set for such a Mix consists of n2 elements. This set
increases exponentially by adding more Mixes to the communication path.
For a path that contains two Mixes, the unlinkability set increases to n4. If
the attacker is able only to observe one Mix round and does not control any of
the Mix users and the Mixes, he is not able to make any statement concerning
the communication links. However, by observing Mixes over a longer period
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of time, an attacker might be able to probabilistically reveal communication
links through statistical analysis. Adding dummy traffic reduces the impact
of statistical attacks, but reduces the efficiency of Mixes.
Some years after Chaum’s initial proposal, new types of Mix were pro-
posed. In order to provide anonymous real-time communication, Jerichow
et al. [40] proposed real-time Mixes, which extend the functionality of tra-
ditional Mixes.
A timed Mix [41] sends the collected messages periodically, once fixed
waiting time t has elapsed. This overcomes the problem with delays, but has
the drawback that in the worst case the unlinkability set consists of only one
communication link. These timed Mixes can be combined with traditional
Mixes in two ways: in the first case, the Mix sends all collected messages
at once when a limit of n messages is reached or a fixed waiting time t has
expired. In the second case, the Mix sends all collected messages at once
when the message limit n is reached and the waiting time t is over. Several
variations of these timed Mixes exist.
Stop-and-Go-Mixes provide probabilistic unlinkability. This kind of Mix
forwards a message with an exponentially distributed delay. The parameter
of the exponential distribution has to be chosen in such that, with high
probability, the Mix forwards each message after a new one arrived. Because
of the exponentially distributed delay the attacker is not able to detect the
order in which the Mix forwards the messages to their destinations.
In summary, Mixes are able to offer unlinkability. The size of the unlink-
ability set and the delay depends on the kind of Mix and the number of users
it has. In theory, a high number of users offers smaller delays at the Mix,
while in practice the users have to share the bandwidth of the Mix. The
delays increase linearly with the number of Mixes in the Mix cascade, while
the absolute value of the delay also depends on the Mix type, the settings
of the Mixes and the number of users. Even if the number of users of a Mix
is high, an attacker is able to perform statistical attacks because the sender
and receiver nodes are detectable. Stop-and-Go Mixes complicate such at-
tacks. In this case, end-to-end mapping of packets is harder because of the
time delay. However, statistical analysis is possible even in this case.
The Mix technique is used for example in Mixminion [42], which is an
anonymous remailer protocol. JAP (Java Anonymous Proxy) [43] uses cas-
cades of Mixes for general Internet communication.
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3.1.3 Onion Routing
The concept of Onion Routing was introduced in [44, 45, 46, 47] and later
improved in [48] under the name of Tor, the ‘second generation onion router’.
It was built for low-latency Internet communication such as web surfing. It
offers bidirectional communication with a performance near to that of real-
time Mixes. In the same way as for common proxies, the unlinkability of
onion routing is achieved by redirecting the network communication over in-
termediate nodes, known as onion routers. To send messages, a user of onion
routing first builds up a circuit, which is a path over several onion routers.
Each of the onion routers knows only its predecessor and successor node
on the path, so that a single malicious onion router is not able to link the
source and the destination of a communication. While building the circuit,
the source node negotiates secret keys with all onion routers on the path.
For the key exchange, the source node builds a message, called an onion,
that contains the secret keys of these onion routers. This onion is recur-
sively encrypted with the public keys of the onion routers, with each layer of
encryption containing a secret key. If an onion router receives such an onion,
it is able to unwrap one layer of encryption. The encryption contains the
secret key which will be used during the onward communication. The rest of
the onion is forwarded to the next node on the path. In the communication
phase, the source node builds onions, which consist of messages, recursively
encrypted with the negotiated keys. These onions are sent over the path of
onion routers. The last onion on the path obtains the messages in plaintext
by decrypting the received onions and forwards these messages to the des-
tination node (see Figure 3.4). Thus, the destination node only knows the
identity of the last onion router on the path. For return communication, the
destination node sends its messages to the last onion router. Every onion
router on the path encrypts the onion with its secret key and passes the
message back along the path to the source node.
The message overhead of the onion routing protocol increases linearly
with the number of onion routers on a circuit. Computationally expensive
34
asymmetric encryption is used only during the build-up of a circuit. Dur-
ing the communication phase, efficient symmetric encryption can be used.
Consequently, the delays at every onion router are small. The overall de-
lay increases linearly with the number of onion routers on the communica-
tion path, because every onion router performs the same operations. The
throughput depends on the throughput of every onion router. It cannot be
better than that of the onion router with the worst throughput. With the
current implementation of Tor, where onion routing is used, the delay and
throughput is, in most cases, sufficient for web surfing.
The good performance and the low latency of onion routing come at the
cost of less dependable unlinkability. Admittedly, the chance that malicious
onion routers completely control a communication link decreases with bigger
circuits, but nevertheless a small number of onion routers under the control
of an attacker provide a good chance of revealing the source and destination
of a communication. Indeed, there have been successful attacks on Tor. By
exploiting some weak points of the onion routing implementation, statistical
attacks can be performed while controlling only a small number of onion
routers. For example, Bauer et al. [49] exploit the mechanism of Tor’s opti-
mization that favours onion routers with high bandwidth and high uptime.
The implementation of Tor also contains a mechanism to periodically build
a new circuit for communication. Generally, a circuit may only be used for
one minute before a new one must be built. But instead of complicating
attacks, since only a limited number of requests to a destination can be
linked to an exit onion router, an attacker controlling only a small number
of onion routers has a good chance of identifying many end-to-end links.
In [50] Wright et al. introduce the predecessor attack, which exploits this
mechanism of replacing the path.
Under the assumption of a strong passive attacker (see Section 2.2), onion
routing is not able to guarantee unlinkability. Even though the onions change
at every hop on the way to the destination, the attacker can easily perform
statistical analysis on the traffic because the source and the destination of a
communication are detectable.
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Figure 3.5: DC-net group with shared keys
3.2 Dining Cryptographers-Based Solutions
With the dining cryptographers’ network (DC-net) [38], Chaum introduced
a protocol for anonymous and unlinkable communication. The users of DC-
net create groups which are used to send and receive messages anonymously.
Sender anonymity is based on the principle of superposed sending; receiver
anonymity on broadcasting messages.
One prerequisite for the protocol is that all nodes share pairwise secret
key bits, which are only used once. The functionality of the protocol is as
follows: Sending of messages is round-based, e.g. only one node is allowed
to send a message in a predefined round. We will show different reservation
techniques later in this section.
In the first step, the participants use an anonymous method to determine
which one of them is allowed to send a single-bit message in the next round.
We denote the sending node with N1 and the other nodes of the DC-net
group with N2 · · ·Nn, where n is the number of nodes that participate in the
DC-net group. Each node Ni, 2 ≤ i ≤ n, builds the sum modulo two of all
secret key bits and broadcasts this value to all members of the group. Node
N1 builds the sum modulo two of the secret key bits and the message and
publishes this value. The sum modulo two of all published values results in
the message that was sent by N1.
We illustrate the protocol with an example. The DC-net group shown
in Figure 3.5 consists of only three nodes N1, N2 and N3 where N1 and N2
share the secret key bit S1,2, N1 and N3 the bit S1,3, N2 and N3 the bit S2,3.
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N1 is the node that is allowed to send its message bit M in the next round.
Now, each node Ni calculates the bit Pi (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) as follows:
N1 : P1 = S1,2 ⊕ S1,3 ⊕M
N2 : P2 = S1,2 ⊕ S2,3
N3 : P3 = S1,3 ⊕ S2,3
These values P1, P2 and P3 are published, so that all nodes are able to
calculate the sum modulo two of these bits. This results in the message bit
M :
N1, N2, N3 : P1 ⊕ P2 ⊕ P3
= S1,2 ⊕ S1,3 ⊕ S1,2 ⊕ S2,3 ⊕ S1,3 ⊕ S2,3 ⊕M
=M
The use of this DC-net protocol, prevents an attacker from inferring any
information concerning the communication link. However, there are some
problems that we have not yet discussed. One problem of the protocol is
that the correct delivery of broadcast messages has to be guaranteed which
is known as the reliable broadcast assumption. As stated above, the secret
key bits are only used once. Chaum proposes for the key distribution either
the use of one-time-pads, e.g. supply disks carrying key bits to the users of
DC-net, or of cryptographic pseudo-random sequence generators, where only
the seed for generating the pseudo-random key string has to be exchanged.
These seeds can securely be exchanged by using asymmetric encryption.
We also did not go into the details of communication rounds reservation.
Chaum proposes two techniques: in the first, a node chooses a time slot in
which it wants to send its messages. If there is a collision, it tries to resend
the message after a randomly chosen delay. The distribution of the waiting
time can be adjusted by reference to the collision rate. The second way of
reserving communication rounds is by first sending a bit vector, where each
bit represents a communication slot. Initially, all elements of the vector are
set to 0. Each node that wants to send a message chooses one communication
slot and marks it with a 1 in the vector. The values of all nodes are published
at once using the superposed sending protocol above. The node that set the
i-th bit of the vector is allowed to send in the i-th communication slot. With
this approach, if an even number of nodes want to send at the same time
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a collision of communication rounds can be detected with high probability
before the sending phase of the DC-net protocol. Later, further reservation
techniques were proposed: Bos and Boer [51] describe an approach based
on factorization of polynomials; Pfitzmann [52] and Waidner [53] use the
reservation map technique; reservation based on superposed sending was in-
troduced by Waidner in [53]; and Mix networks were used by Studholme and
Blake in [54]. Further improvements on the protocol have been made: Waid-
ner and Pfitzmann remove the reliable broadcast assumption in [55] through
the use of a Byzantine agreement protocol. The Byzantine agreement proto-
col gives a way how to reach a consensus between distributed parties if some
of them give incorrect inputs.
The reservation phase and the superposed sending are weak points of
the protocol. In Chapter 4, attacks on DC-net exploits these weaknesses to
allow the attacker to disrupt the execution of the protocol, or to reveal the
sender of a packet.
Besides these weaknesses the message overhead of the DC-net approach
is also critical. Because of the superposed sending, all nodes have to send a
message to all participants of the DC-net whenever any one node wants to
send a message. By enlarging the DC-net group linearly in order to increase
the degree of anonymity and unlinkability, the message overhead is increased
quadratically. The delay also increases significantly because of the huge
amount of messages that must be sent: every node sends and receives n− 1
messages during communication. The reservation phase induces additional
delays. To avoid this overhead some protocols, such as Acimn [14] and
Herbivore [56], limit the size of the DC-net groups.
Chaum proposes the reduction of message overhead by building cycles.
Instead of broadcasting the messages the users build a ring, wherein message
bits are sent only between neighboring users. To send a message, the bit has
to pass around the ring twice: in the first round the message is constructed
by building the sum modulo two of the message with the secret key. In the
second round the message is published to all users of the ring. In this case,
2 · n messages are needed to send only one message; additional messages are
needed for the key exchange. Disrupting the protocol in this communication
setting is even simpler, because the outputs are only visible to the direct
neighbors in the ring. Moreover, all nodes still have to share pairwise secret
keys, which are used only once.
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3.3 Conclusion
The proxy-based approaches presented in this chapter do not offer anonym-
ity but unlinkability, from the perspective of a strong passive attacker. The
reason for that is that the attacker is able to observe the endpoints of a com-
munication and therefore knows who sent packets and who received packets.
Only the DC-net approach can guarantee sender and receiver anonymity,
because here the attacker is not able to detect which nodes sent or received
packets. In fact, it can be proven that in theory no information on the sender
and receiver of a message can be gained simply by passively observing the
network traffic. However, for the correct execution of the protocol, some
difficult assumptions, such as the reliable broadcast assumption, must be
guaranteed.
The techniques presented show that there is a connection between effec-
tiveness and performance: if a protocol is more efficient, it is more likely
that an attacker can break the unlinkability or anonymity. In general, the
proxy-based approaches are efficient enough with respect to throughput and
communication delay for practical use. For this reason, all protocols that are
used in practice are based on this technique. On the other hand, the DC-net
approach lacks scalability, which is the main reason why it is not used in
practice.
In this thesis we do not present all existing protocols for anonymous or
unlinkable communication. This is because most approaches are variations of
the techniques presented. In the area of anonymous ad hoc communication,
protocol design concentrates on route discovery, which is not the subject of
this thesis.
In the following chapter we show attacks on protocols for anonymous
and unlinkable communication. Most of the attacks affect the proxy-based
approaches, but there exist also attacks on DC-nets. We will show how
attacks can break the unlinkability and anonymity of the protocols.
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Chapter 4
Attacks on Anonymity
Protocols
This chapter builds on [12] and shows a variety of attacks on anonymity
protocols. Exposing weaknesses in existing protocols and analyzing how at-
tackers are able to infer information on communication links, is helpful in
developing new and better protocols for anonymous or unlinkable commu-
nication. Also, these attacks show which protocols are unable to guarantee
anonymity or unlinkability, and therefore should not be used in the future.
From the attacker’s perspective, it is interesting to know how these systems
can be broken, in order to reveal communication links. With this knowledge,
attacks can be performed not only by public institutions, but also by private
companies for observing employees and for commercial issues.
The manner in which these attacks may be performed depends on the
capabilities of the attacker; the attacker models introduced in Section 2.2
are also relevant to this chapter. Passive attackers are attackers that collect
information by passively observing network traffic and making a statistical
analysis of this data. The attacks in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.2 assume
this attacker model.
An active attacker is additionally able to manipulate the network traffic
and might be able to control parts of the system or some of the users. We
show attacks that are based on this attacker model in Section 4.1.2. These
active attacks can be used in combination with passive attacks. In this case,
the attacker tries to modify the system, in order that passive attacks may
be performed more easily.
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The attack analysis in this chapter is intended to be independent of the
protocol used. In figures we will use the notation anonymous system (AS),
as in Figure 4.1, to denote the infrastructure that is used for the execution
of the protocol. We designate the sender by S, the receiver by R and the
attacker by A.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In the first part (see
Section 4.1) we show a number of attacks that have been presented in the
literature and categorize these attacks as passive or active. Section 4.2 in-
troduces the slotted packet-counting attack. This attacks uses the idea of
common packet-counting attacks as its starting point, i.e. the attacker counts
the number of packets sent and received at two different positions in the net-
work, but eliminates the large number of false positives by taking account
for the alteration of the traffic load over time. Finally, we show the influence
of the attacks presented on a variety of anonymity systems in Section 4.3.
4.1 State of the Art
In this section we give an overview of known attacks on anonymity and un-
linkability protocols. We divide the attacks into passive attacks (see Section
4.1.1) and active attacks (see Section 4.1.2). Section 4.3 shows the influence
of the attacks presented in this section, and in the following Section 4.2, on
the protocols presented in Chapter 3.
4.1.1 Passive Attacks
Passive attacks on anonymity systems are mainly based on statistical analysis
of network traffic. For this, we assume the strong passive attacker model
introduced in Section 2.2.1, Defintion 8. In addition, most of the attacks
can also be performed by weaker attackers, having incomplete knowledge of
network traffic.
Packet-counting
In packet-counting attacks, the attacker observes traffic at two different
points in the network. By counting the packets sent and received at these
two points, the attacker tries to detect whether these packets belong to a
single communication link. If the packet count at these two points is similar,
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the attacker assumes that they belong to a single communication link. The
problem of this assumption is that other communications may overlap at one
of these points. This results in different packet counts even if a particular
link between a sender and receiver was actually routed through these points.
On the other hand, it might also be possible that there are two stations in
the network that have a similar volume of sent and received packets even
though the sent packets are not related to those received. In fact, by know-
ing only the packet counts, the attacker is able only to determine the relative
frequencies of packet counts on sender and receiver side, which increase if
the number of packets counted on sender or receiver side increases. In Sec-
tion 4.2 we give more details on packet-counting and present an improved
version.
Message Coding and Packet Volume Attacks
By knowing the content or the coding of a packet, the attacker can acquire
information that helps him by linking multiple packets to a single communi-
cation. This kind of attack is known as message coding attack. For example,
if the content of the packet is the same when it enters as when it leaves an
anonymity system, as is the case while using proxies, the attacker can eas-
ily link these packets to a single communication. This weakness also exists
in some other protocols for anonymous communication, such as in ANODR
[57].
If the content of the packet is in plaintext, the attacker might receive
information on the source or the destination of the packet. To avoid such
attacks, packets should be not readable by the attacker and if a packet is
observable at different points by the attacker, its appearance should change.
Packet volume attacks (see [58, 45]) are similar to the message coding
attack with the difference that the attacker tries to identify packets belonging
to a single communication link by comparing their length. To avoid this
attack, most protocols for anonymous and unlinkable communication use a
constant packet length. If the size of the data is smaller than the pre-defined
size of the message, the sender pads the message with dummy bits until it
reaches the desired size.
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Timing Attacks
Timing attacks, as presented in [45, 59], use the timing of packets in order to
map them to a communication link. In order to perform this mapping, the
attacker estimates the latencies of packets when sent over different routes.
He stores these values for use during the attack. If the attacker now wants
to find the communication partner D of a node S, he observes traffic at two
points: The packets that are sent from node S and the packets that are
received by a suspected node P . If the latency of sending at S and receiving
at P matches the pre-computed value, it is very likely that the attacker has
found the destination node D = P .
If the attacker is only able to observe the traffic at node S, he can measure
the latency between sending a message from S and receiving the reply from
D. This technique can also be used for geolocation in the Internet [60]. Here,
an attacker measures the latency of a ping message that he sent to a node
in the Internet.
Communication Pattern Attack
The idea of the communication pattern attack is similar to that of message
coding and packet volume attacks. The difference is that the attacker tries
to find special features in the communication pattern rather than in the mes-
sages. As in [59], the attacker can compare the communication patterns at
two different points in the network. If they are similar for some period of
time, it is very likely that these communication patterns belong to a single
communication link. These traffic patterns are detectable even if the com-
munication is encrypted, overcoming a weakness of the coding and volume
attacks.
Another way to use traffic patterns to reveal communicating nodes is by
using the technique presented by Dusi et al. [61]. They show how a means
of detecting that a blocked protocol, e.g. peer-to-peer communication, is
being tunneled over a legitimate protocol such as HTTP. This is possible
even if the communication is encrypted. If the attacker of an anonymity or
unlinkability protocol is able to detect when a special protocol is being used
for communication, he might be able to reduce the set of possible receiver
nodes.
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Intersection Attack
In the intersection attack [59], it is assumed that the participants in the net-
work usually communicate with the same communication partner for some
time. If the attacker observes the network over an extended period of time,
he might be able to detect the time points where the target node S sends
messages and other nodes receive messages. By intersecting the sets of re-
ceiving nodes, the attacker tries to reduce the receiver anonymity set.
Under the name of disclosure attack, Agrawal and Kesdogan [62] give a
more detailed and improved version of this attack. Further details can be
found in [63, 64]. In the first step of the attack, the attacker has to estimate
the number m of communication partners of the target node, S, by using
observations. The attacker then builds recipient sets Bt = {bt1, · · · , btn}
that contain all nodes that received a message from S at time point t. t is
increased by one if S sends a message, e.g. at time point 1, S sends the first
message.
After this, a learning phase and an exclusion phase must be carried out.
In the learning phase, the attacker chooses those recipient sets Bi, such that
B = {Bj1 , · · · , Bjm}, with Bjx ∩ Bjy = ∅ for x 6= y. The elements of B are
called the basis sets. Because the attacker builds sets only when S is sending,
there is exactly one communication partner in the sets Bji , 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
In the exclusion phase, the attacker makes new observations which lead
to a new recipient set R. This recipient set R is intersected with the basis
sets. Because there is exactly one communication partner in every basis set
there is at least one intersection between the new recipient set and a basis
set that is not empty. Empty intersections are not possible, because Agrawal
and Kesdogan assume that the attacker knows the number of communication
partners m of S. If there is more than one non-empty intersection, the new
recipient set is discarded. Alternatively, if there is an intersection with only
one basis set Bji , the communication partner must be in the intersection of
the recipient set R and the basis set Bji . A new basis set, B′ji , is built with
B′ji = Bji ∩ R. This process is repeated until every basis set contains only
one node, which is a communication partner of node S.
Further work on the disclosure attack as applied to Mix networks was
done by Agrawal et al. [65] and Danezis et al. [66]. Agrawal et al. show the
NP-completeness of their disclosure attack and give estimates for the learning
and exclusion phase. Danezis et al. improve the disclosure attack through
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the use of statistical methods, so that its complexity is in P. Kesdogan and
Pimenidis [67] introduce the same attack as the hitting set attack. They too
use statistical methods to avoid a runtime complexity in NP.
The drawback of this kind of attack is that a large set of observations is
needed to satisfy the assumption that the law of large numbers applies.
4.1.2 Active Attacks
In active attacks, the attacker tries actively to bring an anonymity system
into a state in which he can make better conclusions concerning the com-
munication links. The active attacker model is introduced in Section 2.2.2,
Definition 9. In most cases, active attacks are used in combination with
passive attacks, as described in Section 4.1.1.
Denial of Service Attack
The aim of a denial of service attack (DoS) is to make a particular resource
unavailable. To do this, an attacker attempts to prevent intended users
of the resource from using it. This can be done by overloading the target
with dummy requests (consumption of computational resources, i.e. band-
width, disk space, CPU time), by preventing the user from using the target
(e.g. disruption of configuration or routing information), or by disrupting
the network traffic by flooding the network (disruption of physical network
components or communication media, e.g. jamming in wireless networks). If
this attack is performed by a coordinated group of attackers, it is called a
distributed denial of service (dDoS).
Such an attack can be used to prevent users from using an anonymous
routing protocol. For example, an attacker might overload the Mixes of a
Mix network, so that the legitimate users can no longer use the service.
Additionally this attack can be used to execute more complex attacks. For
example, Borisov et al. [68] apply selective DoS attacks against a variety of
anonymity systems in order to break their anonymity. Later in this section
we will show more attacks that make use of DoS.
Replay Attack
In a replay attack, the attacker records packets sent over the network in
order to replay them at a later time. Such an attack can be used to bypass
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access control mechanisms, allowing the attacker to access secured resources.
For example, an attacker can record the login process to a computer in the
network. Later, he can replay this login information consisting of login name
and encrypted password to gain access to the computer. To gain access
to secured resources, the attacker does not necessarily need to break the
encryption of passwords. Such an attack can be prevented with the use of
one time passwords or session keys, as in TLS/SSL [69].
Login is not the only aspect of anonymous and unlinkable communica-
tions systems that is vulnerable to replay attacks: the replay of ordinary data
packets can also help to break anonymity or unlinkability. The more pack-
ets are sent over the communication path, the more accurate traffic analysis
becomes. If an attacker wants to know the destination of only one specific
packet, he records it and resends it several times. This technique allows the
attacker to gather enough information for traffic analysis without having to
wait until the sending node has transmitted a sufficient number of packets.
In order to prevent such an attack, a Mix, as proposed by Chaum [37], checks
every received packet to see whether it has been sent before.
Message Delaying Attack
Message delaying (see [59]) can be used to facilitate other attacks. An at-
tacker delays packets in order to bring the network into a state where he can
easily perform other attacks. The attacker can use this technique to attack
stop-and-go Mixes (see Section 3.1.2). To do this, he delays packets such
that only one message is separated in the Mix. It is also possible that the
attacker temporarily blocks some inputs to an anonymity system, in order
to ease the analysis of the other users. As we will see later, this technique is
used to help attacks such as the (n-1)-attack.
Clogging Attack
A combination of a packet-counting and a denial of service attack leads to
the clogging attack [70]. In this attack, the attacker wants to know the
originator of a traffic flow. For this, he observes the message flow between
two nodes ASn and R (see Figure 4.1, dashed line from ASn to A) and
floods randomly-chosen nodes of the network with a large amount of traffic
(see Figure 4.1, line from A to AS1). If the traffic to node R collapses, it
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Figure 4.2: Setup for (n-1)-Attack
is highly probable that the flooded node is part of the communication path
to node R. By successively choosing neighbors of the detected nodes, the
originator S of the traffic can be revealed. This attack can only be successful
if node S sends a high volume of traffic to the same node over an extended
period of time, because traffic of other nodes could also be the reason for a
collapse in traffic at node R.
(n-1)-Attack
The (n-1)-Attack targets Mixes and Mix networks [71, 72]. It is also known
by the name of blending attacks. The attacker floods a Mix node with fake
messages in order to trace a single message from an honest user. The setup of
the (n-1)-Attack is shown in Figure 4.2. In this figure, the light gray inputs
and outputs of the Mix belong to the attacker, while the dark gray input
and output belong to the honest user. The attacker is able to recognize his
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Figure 4.3: Setup for watermarking attack
messages when entering and leaving the Mix and therefore link the message
from the honest user to its receiver.
To launch this attack, the attacker must be able to first delay or hin-
der other messages from being sent to the Mix and he must also be able
to insert fake messages into the Mix. Some Mixes are able to detect (n-
1)-Attacks and can react either by stopping the operation or by generating
a response designed to confuse the attacker. For instance Red-Green-Black
Mixes (RGB-Mix) [73] have a mechanism to detect such attacks. A RGB-Mix
injects heartbeat messages addressed to itself by way of a path traversing
some other Mix nodes. If an attacker tries to perform a (n-1)-Attack, the
stream of heartbeat messages collapses. As reaction the RGB-Mix injects
dummy messages at the output link of the Mix in order to confuse the at-
tacker.
Watermarking Attack
Watermarking is also used to make traffic analysis easier. In this case, the
attacker modifies a traffic flow to make it contain a specific pattern. If this
pattern is detected at another position in the network, the two traffic flows
are considered to be linked. For this attack, the attacker either belongs to
the communication path, for example in a Mix network by controlling one
Mix; or the attacker is able to block traffic between two nodes and insert
modified packets (see Figure 4.3).
Watermarking is used for traffic analysis in [74, 75, 76]. A defense against
such an attack is proposed in [77], where a method is introduced to detect
and remove watermarks from traffic flows.
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A variant of the watermarking technique is used in the send n’ seek at-
tack [59], which improves packet-counting attacks by inserting messages in
the communication. In this case the attacker wants to uncover the identity of
a recipient, for example in a privacy-protecting email system. The attacker
sends a number of messages to the anonymous recipient. After having sent
the messages, he tries to find the same number of messages at a receiving
node. If he finds such a node, he assumes that this is the anonymous recipi-
ent.
Wei Dais’ Attack on Traffic Shaping
The original attack is published online at [78] and it is referenced by Back
et al. in [70]. The attack targets traffic shaping. Traffic shaping is used
by some anonymity protocols to hide the real traffic, for example by always
sending a constant volume of traffic. If there is not enough real network
traffic, the anonymity system generates dummy traffic between its stations.
In the attack introduced by Dai, the attacker builds a route over stations
of the anonymity system back to himself and increases his traffic as far as
possible. At some point the bandwidth limit is reached. The attacker is now
able to determine the amount of real network traffic that is sent between
the stations of the anonymity system by removing its own traffic from the
bandwidth limit.
Attack on Reservation in DC-net
The weak point of the DC-net protocol (see Section 3.2) is the reservation
of communication rounds. During the reservation phase of the protocol, the
users of the DC-net agree an order for communication, in which each user
should only know his own position for sending. An attacker can use this
reservation phase to disrupt the protocol.
By changing some bits randomly in his output message, an attacker can
prevent other users from sending messages. Chaum proposes a way to find
such disrupters. The honest participants use traps in order to find attackers.
First, the honest participant fixes the index i of the round where he wants
to lay the trap, a random message M and a symmetric key k. He then
publishes the random message M and the index i, both encrypted with the
secret key k. Later, during the execution of the reservation protocol, he
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reserves the communication slot i in which he sends his random message M .
If this message is disrupted by an attacker, he publishes the secret key k,
allowing all participants to identify the attacker that has been caught by the
trap. Zero-knowledge proof techniques can also be used to find disrupters
in DC-net. This technique was introduced by Golle and Juels [79] and later
used by Franck [80].
Attack on Traps in DC-net
The traps which have been introduced in the previous section introduce new
vulnerabilities to the DC-net protocol. In an attack described in [55], the
attacker builds a trap without reserving the corresponding communication
round. If an honest participant P reserves this communication round by
chance, the attacker can later open his trap. As the output sent by the
honest participant is different from the random message in the trap, all
participants have to reveal their secret keys. As result, the anonymity of P
is broken.
4.2 Slotted Packet-Counting
The slotted packet-counting attack, as introduced in this section, was pub-
lished by us in [12]. Common packet-counting attacks make strong assump-
tions about the setup, which can easily lead to incorrect conclusions, as
explained in Section 4.2.1. To overcome these limitations, we propose the
slotted packet-counting attack, which accounts for the variation of traffic
load over time. We use correlation to express the relation between sender
and receiver nodes. Our attack is applicable to many anonymity and unlink-
ability protocols, such as Tor and Mix networks (see Section 4.3). It assumes
a passive attacker and works with incomplete knowledge of network traffic.
4.2.1 Motivation
Common packet-counting attacks, as introduced in recent literature (see [70,
59, 34]), are not efficient when a passive attacker, as described in Section
2.2, Definition 8, is assumed. In the following we briefly explain this type of
attack, and show that in most scenarios packet counts at sender and receiver
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Figure 4.4: Example for packet-counting
side do not offer enough information to link a sender to the receiver of a
communication.
The idea of packet-counting attacks, as described in the literature, is that
the attacker can observe the sending and receiving of packets. The attacker
counts these sending and receiving events and tries to find similarities in or-
der to derive plausible pairs of communication partners. This is only possible
if a relation between the similarity of the number of sending and receiving
events and the probability for the associated communication link exists.
Assume that the attacker has no further information except the number
of packets sent by some sender nodes S1, · · · , Sn and received by receiver
nodes R1, · · · , Rm. Then, the probability that a node Si sent a packet to
node Rj does not actually depend on how similar the number of sent packets
by Si and received packets at Rj are. The only thing one can say is that
the probability becomes higher the more packets Si sends and the more
packets Rj receives provided that, at the same time, the number of sender
and receiver nodes stays constant. This becomes clear when considering the
following example.
Figure 4.4 shows an anonymity system with sender nodes S1, · · · , S5
and receiver nodes R1, · · · , R5, as it is seen by an attacker. For evaluation
of attacks we show the same setting in Table 4.1, where additionally the
communication partners and the corresponding number of packets are given.
Now, assuming that we have no further information except the number of
packets sent and received, as in Figure 4.4, we can compute the probabilities
for every node Si communicating with Rj as relative frequencies. We write
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Table 4.1: Communication partners
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
R1 0 0 25 0 0
R2 32 0 0 31 0
R3 0 3 0 0 0
R4 5 15 0 0 56
R5 2 0 5 0 0
Table 4.2: Likelihood for communication
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
R1 0.999 0.948 0.994 0.995 1.000
R2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
R3 0.535 0.281 0.435 0.447 0.691
R4 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
R5 0.837 0.541 0.741 0.753 0.938
c(Si) to denote the number of packets that node Si sends, and c(Rj) for
the number of packets received by node Rj respectively. We denote the
number of all receiver nodes by n. The nodes Rk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n together receive∑n
k=1 c(Rk) packets, and Rk, 1 ≤ k ≤ n, k 6= j together receive
∑n
k=1
k 6=j
c(Rk)
packets. With this information we can calculate the probability of Si having
sent a packet to Rj by:
P (Si sent to Rj) = 1−
(∑n
k=1
k 6=j
c(Rk)
c(Si)
)
(∑n
k=1 c(Rk)
c(Si)
) . (4.1)
The resulting probabilities when using the values of Figure 4.4 are shown
in Table 4.2. The bold entries in the table indicate where actually a com-
munication took place (see also Table 4.1). The table shows that the more
packets sent by a node Si and the more packets received by a node Rj the
higher is the probability that at least one packet was sent by Si to Rj . Hence,
correlation of sender nodes and receiver nodes only by counting packets is
not very effective.
This negative effect is also explored in existing literature. Raymond [59]
says that only if one node sends an unusual number of packets, can the
attacker find the receiver of this unusual number of packets. Serjantov and
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Sewell [34] stress that packet-counting only works if the whole connection
is lone. This means that several connections using an anonymity system at
the same time neither share incoming links nor outgoing links of the system,
i.e. the number of packets counted for an incoming or outgoing link can be
related to one unique connection. Aside from the fact that this is a strong
assumption, it is not always possible for the attacker to find out whether a
connection is lone or not. Therefore, using only the packet counts at sender
and receiver side does not provide enough information to make a reliable
mapping of sender and receiver nodes. In the next section, we show how to
improve the attack by taking account for the alteration of packet counts on
sender and receiver side over time.
4.2.2 Attack Details
Our slotted packet-counting attack builds on the idea of earlier packet-
counting attacks. The main difference is that, with slotted packet-counting,
we measure the alteration of traffic on sender and receiver sides over time.
If the alterations on both sides correlate, the probability that they commu-
nicated increases.
To measure the alteration of the packet counts over time, the attacker
counts the sending and receiving events in time slots t1, · · · , tm. For every
sender node Si we build a random variable CSi with values ck(Si),1 ≤ k ≤ m,
giving the number of packets sent in time slot tk. In the same way, we have
a random variable CRj with values ck(Rj), 1 ≤ k ≤ m, representing the
number of packets received in time slot tk at node Rj .
To link the packets in time slot tk at the sender side to packets at receiver
side, the attacker has to be aware of timing. Because packets need some time
to transit through the anonymity system, he must shift the time slot tk at
receiver side by this delay. We give more details on this issue later in this
section.
We can now calculate the correlation between the random variables of
the sender nodes and the random variables of the receiver nodes in order
to map them together (for details on probability theory see e.g. [81]). The
correlation coefficient of two random variables gives the strength and direc-
tion of their linear relationship. Its value is in the interval [−1, 1], where 0
stands for non-correlating variables, 1 and −1 for correlating variables. We
are only interested in the cases where the correlation coefficient is near to
53
1, what means that the random variables have a positive linear relationship.
These are the cases where it is highly probable that the corresponding nodes
communicated with each other. The correlation coefficient of two random
variables X and Y is calculated as follows:
ρX,Y =
cov(X,Y )
σxσy
=
E((X − µX)(Y − µY ))
σxσy
. (4.2)
In order to calculate the correlation coefficient of two random variables
CSi and CRj , we need the related expectation values µSi and µRj as well as
the standard deviations σSi and σRj . We assume that the random variables
CSi and CRj have a Gaussian distribution and justify this with the central
limit theorem (see [81]). From this, we can calculate the expectation value
µSi as follows:
µSi =
1
m
m∑
k=1
ck(Si) . (4.3)
Additionally, we can compute the standard deviation σSi by:
σSi =
√√√√ 1
m
m∑
k=1
(µSi − ck(Si))2 . (4.4)
Having calculated the expected values and standard deviations for all
sender and receiver nodes we can calculate the correlation between every pair
of sender Si and receiver Rj . In the following, we illustrate the calculations
by means of an example.
Example
We use the network and traffic of Figure 4.4 but split the observations of
the traffic into five time slots t1, · · · , t5. Table 4.3 shows the slotted packet
count for sent packets with S1, · · · , S5; Table 4.4 for received packets with
R1, · · · , R5.
With these values we can calculate expectation values and standard de-
viations for all combinations of sender and receiver nodes using the formulae
(4.3) and (4.4). Table 4.5 shows the correlation coefficients of sender and
receiver nodes calculated with formula (4.2). From these values one can
conclude that the nodes S2 and R1, S1 and R3, S2 and R4, S4 and R5
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Table 4.3: Received packet count by time slot
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
S1 7 3 14 6 9
S2 3 3 7 3 2
S3 7 11 3 7 2
S4 3 8 6 2 12
S5 8 12 4 20 12
Table 4.4: Packet count for receiving per time slot
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
R1 6 9 1 7 2
R2 8 11 18 5 21
R3 3 0 0 0 0
R4 8 15 13 26 14
R5 3 2 2 0 0
communicated with high probability (bold entries in Table 4.5); this also
agrees with the assumed communication pattern given in Table 4.1. The
comparison with the results of common packet-counting in Table 4.2 clearly
shows that much more precise results are obtained by taking correlation into
account.
Parameters of the Attack
We have already shown the basic concept of slotted packet-counting attacks.
This section covers some techniques for the application of the attack in prac-
tice.
The slotted packet-counting attack provides a means of determining
whether a node S communicated with a node R. In the description of the
attack we explained how the attacker applies the slotted packet-counting
Table 4.5: Correlation coefficients of sender and receiver nodes
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
R1 -0.938 -0.492 0.961 -0.385 0.547
R2 0.623 0.252 -0.721 0.843 -0.536
R3 -0.109 -0.172 0.155 -0.444 -0.302
R4 -0.257 -0.147 0.147 -0.274 0.846
R5 0.018 0.363 0.362 -0.296 -0.704
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Figure 4.5: Locating communication slots
attack to a given set of communication slots. Here, we will give rules for
choosing the communication slots that are used for the attack.
The problem is that the attacker has to find the points in time when S
communicates with R. To do this, the attacker measures the packets sent at
node S and received at node R during the time period, in which he guesses
that a communication has occurred. He divides the observations in m time
slots of length s and takes n < m of these time slots for measuring the
correlation. Therefore, he applies the slotted packet-counting attack for all
intervals with the time slots ti to ti+n, 1 ≤ i ≤ m − n (see Figure 4.5). A
correlation coefficient close to one for any of the intervals indicates with high
probability that there was a communication. If there exists more than one
such interval, the probability that S sent packets to R becomes higher.
Slot size and number of slots The attacker has first to specify the values
for size of time slots s and the number of time slots n. The optimal values for
s and n mainly depend on the communication characteristics. Using longer
time slots or a higher number of time slots does not necessarily mean that it is
easier for an attacker to find a correlation. In the optimal case, the duration
s · n of the observation is exactly as long as the communication period of
the two target nodes. If the observation time becomes longer, the chance
increases that the sender node sends packets to different receiver nodes or
that another sender node interferes at the receiver side (giving more false
negatives). On the other hand, a short observation interval makes it more
likely that correlation between sender and receiver nodes occur even if there
is no communication (more false positives). We show how to optimize the
slot size and the number of communication slots used for a concrete attack
scenario in Section 4.2.3.
Delay In order to map packets to the same time slots on sender and receiver
side, the attacker has to be aware of timing. Packets traveling from the sender
node S to the receiver node R need some time d to transit the network and
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the anonymity system. In order to have a packet p that is sent at S and
received by R in the same time slot tk at S and R, the attacker has to shift
the time slot on receiver side by the delay d. This delay d depends on the
network, the network load, the positions of S and R in the network, and the
anonymity system. To approximate d, the attacker can send test messages,
allowing him to measure the time delay between sending and receiving a
message while using an anonymity system. More information on timing of
packets can be found in [82]. We will assume this timing in the application
of the attack in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.3 The Attack in Practice
In this section, we apply the attack to real network traffic. As we have
already seen, the efficiency of the slotted packet-counting attack depends
on several parameters. We define these parameters and optimize them for
the given traffic traces. It is important to note that different scenarios lead
to different optimal parameters. We give a mechanism for finding these
parameters that is applicable to all network traffic traces.
Setting
In order to define the parameters for the attack, we apply it to captured
network traffic traces, namely the LBL-PKT-5 traffic traces [83] of TCP
traffic. The traffic was captured at the Lawrence Berkely Laboratory from
57
OR1 ORn
A
S R
Figure 4.7: Setup for attacking Tor
14:00 to 15:00 on January 28, 1994. We assume two scenarios where we
want to measure the correlation coefficient: in the first, we assume a Mix
with different numbers of input and output links, where one slot refers to
one communication round. The attacker receives all packets going to and
coming from the Mix (see Figure 4.6). In the second scenario, we assume a
low-latency anonymity protocol, such as Tor, where we use time intervals to
define communication slots. In this case, the attacker only needs to capture
the incoming traffic of the first onion router and the outgoing traffic of the
last onion router on the path (see Figure 4.7).
We execute the attack with varying parameters:
Threshold The threshold for the correlation coefficient. If this threshold is
exceeded, the algorithm assumes a communication link. We vary this
parameter in the interval from 0.90 to 0.99.
Number of slots We vary the number of slots which are used for the mea-
surement of the correlation coefficient from 3 to 500.
Size of slots For the Mix scenario we assume Mixes with 5 to 455 inputs
and for the Tor scenario we use slots of size from 0.5 sec to 5 sec.
For evaluation, we start the algorithm with different input traces and
every possible combination of parameters and use the mean of the different
runs. In the following, we discuss the results of the measurements.
Identifying Parameters
We use the F-Measure [84] to identify optimal values for the size and the
number of slots used for the measurement. The value of the F-Measure is
in the interval (0, 1], where higher values signify a higher accuracy. We use
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the F-Measure to provide a trade-off between false negatives and the false
positives that occur when only a few slots are used for the measurement.
The F-Measure is calculated as follows:
F =
2 · tp
2 · tp+ fn+ fp,
where tp means true positive, fn means false negative, and fp means false
positive.
The reason for false negatives is mainly interference from other commu-
nications, i.e. changes in communication links or nodes communicating with
more than one node. This interference can be minimized by using a shorter
period of time for the measurement.
Figure 4.8 and 4.9 show that the value for the F-Measure depends on
the size and the number of communication slots. In both examples, we fixed
the threshold for the correlation coefficient to 0.95. In the Mix scenario we
vary the number of slots used and the size, i.e. number of incoming and
outgoing links. The size of a Mix is defined in its specification and cannot
be manipulated by the attacker. The F-Measure value reaches its maximum
for 90 slots for a Mix of size 5 and around 10 slots for a Mix of size between
50 and 500. We achieved the best results for the Tor scenario at a slot size
of 0.5 seconds and 13 slots. The F-Measure value becomes smaller when we
increase the size of the slots, while the optimum number of measured slots
stays in the region of 13 slots. We did not apply the attack with smaller slot
sizes to the Tor scenario because we idealized the network scenario for the
tests by removing network delays. In real network settings, delays and jitter
can result in packet counts that are not precise enough if the slot sizes are
too small.
Figure 4.10 gives an example in which an increase in the number of
communication slots used for measuring the correlation coefficient does not
lead to a better correlation. In the example, a fixed node Si sends packets to
a fixed node Rj . At some point, node Si changes its communication partner
to node Rk. This results in a decreasing correlation coefficient between the
sending and receiving events of Si and Rj .
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Figure 4.8: F-Measure of Mix scenario
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Figure 4.9: F-Measure of Tor scenario
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Figure 4.10: Correlation coefficient of nodes Si and Rj
Discussion
The application of the slotted packet-counting attack to real network traffic
traces shows the practicability of the attack. We showed how to adjust
the parameters of the attack in order to improve the output of the attack.
Further improvements in the parameters are possible: it might be better to
use different parameters for different communication settings. For example,
visiting a web site on the Internet produces a different number of packets
from a VoIP phone call. For communication settings where a lot of traffic
is produced, the attack will be more precise when using more slots. A large
number of slots offers no useful results for settings where only few packets
are sent over a short period of time.
As we have seen in the previous section the attack can fail in two ways:
In the first case, there is a strong correlation between a sender node Si
and a receiver node Rj although there has been no communication between
these nodes (false positive). One reason can be that the measurement uses
insufficient information, i.e. the period of time covered by the measurement
is too short. Another reason might be that the sets of sender and receiver
nodes are too big, giving a higher chance of correlations between sender and
receiver nodes that are not communicating. Hence, one aspect making this
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attack effective is the minimization of the set of potential sender and receiver
nodes. For instance by additionally using the timing of sending and receiving
events, the set of potential sender and receiver nodes can be reduced. By
combining these techniques we might gain better results for slotted packet-
counting attacks.
The second manner of failure is when there is no correlation between
nodes Si and Rj even though these nodes are communicating (false negative).
As seen in the previous section, this happens if there is interference from
other nodes, i.e. there is a node Sk also sending packets to Rj , so that the
number of received packets at Rj is related not only to the sending of Si.
In this case, the attacker can calculate the correlation between the sum of
packets counted at the sender nodes Si and Sk and the packets counted at
the receiver node Rj . For performance reasons, this grouping of sender and
receiver nodes should be limited to small groups.
Note that the problems addressed above also exist in the packet-counting
attacks described in Section 4.2.1. However, slotted packet-counting has the
advantage that false positives are less probable, because they only occur when
the packet count is similar in every slot. Also, good results can be obtained
by just observing the nodes of interest because the correlation coefficient
needs only knowledge of the sending and receiving of these nodes. Only for
more complex attacks, as mentioned above, is more information needed.
In general, this attack is applicable to all anonymity protocols where the
attacker is able to detect sending and the receiving events. In more specific
settings where there is only a limited group of users of the anonymity protocol
(e.g. anonymity protocols for ad hoc networks such as [57], [85] and [86]),
the slotted packet-counting attack is even more effective. The only way
to prevent any kind of packet-counting for this class of protocols is to use
constant link padding, which is not practicable in most settings because of
the overhead it produces (see also [59]). What is more, as stated in Section
4.1.2, there exist methods to filter the padded traffic out of the stream. Other
attacks, such as watermarking, might improve the slotted packet-counting
attacks.
A similar approach to slotted packet-counting is proposed by [82]. The
authors use cross correlation to map input and output traffic of Mixes, while
we concentrate on the mapping of sender and receiver devices. They show
the effect of network parameters on the attack but perform no optimization
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of the attack parameters. We also give rules on how to find parameters for
the attack in different network settings.
4.3 Efficiency of Attacks
In this section we show the influence on unlinkability of the attacks presented
in the previous two sections on protocols for unlinkable communication. Ta-
ble 4.6 gives the minimal degree of unlinkability that the system is able to
guarantee when the attacker performs one of the given attacks (see Section
2.1 for the measures). In order to calculate the degree of unlinkability, we
assume a network with m participants, where the Mixes have n in- and out-
puts, the paths in Tor consist of arbitrarily many onion routers and, in the
case of a DC-net, the groups consist of n nodes. Most of the attacks need to
observe the sending and receiving of several messages. We assume a strong
attacker who is able to perform the attack in the best possible way, i.e. he
is able to observe every message that is sent over an extended period. This
gives the worst case degree of unlinkability. In practice, most of the attacks
are not as effective as stated in the table, due to a shorter observation time
and weaker attackers.
Some of the attacks are not able to compromise the unlinkability on their
own but can be used to facilitate other kinds of attacks, such as the denial
of service attack and delaying attack, which can help the (n-1)-Attack.
The table shows that Mixes and Tor are vulnerable to most kinds of
traffic analysis attacks, where DC-net offers at least a degree of unlinkability
of log2 n. The unlinkability of Mixes and Tor basically relies on the fact that
traffic analysis attacks are hard to perform and, in most cases, the attacker is
not able to collect enough information to make a reliable mapping of sender
and receiver nodes.
The DC-net approach is not vulnerable to most of the passive attacks.
Only communication pattern attacks have a chance of success, assuming
that the attacker has previous knowledge on the participants of the DC-net
group. For example, this is the case when the attacker is able to detect com-
munication patterns for which only a subset of the DC-net group members
might be the originator or the receiver, e.g. the attacker detects a protocol
of a service which only some of the group members offer. There also exist
attacks on round reservation and superposed sending, which can either be
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Table 4.6: Influence of attacks on protocols for unlinkable communication
with n users in networks with m nodes
Mix Tor DC-net
Packet-counting attack 0 0 log2 n
Slotted packet-counting attack 0 0 log2 n
Message coding attack log2m log2m log2m
Packet volume attack log2m log2m log2m
Timing attack 0 0 log2 n
Communication pattern attack 0 0 0
Intersection attack 0 0 log2 n
Denial of service attack no service no service no service
Replay attack log2m log2m log2m
Delaying attack log2m log2m log2m
Clogging attack 0 0 log2 n
(n-1)-Attack 0 n.a. n.a.
Watermarking attack n.a. n.a. n.a.
Wei Dais’ attack n.a. 0 n.a.
Attack on reservation n.a. n.a. no service
Attack on traps n.a. n.a. 0
used to disrupt the execution of the protocol, or to reveal a communication
link.
Additionally, the weaknesses in the protocol design also the implemen-
tation of the protocols might introduce new vulnerabilities. For example,
the attack of Bauer et al. [49] exploits the mechanism of the path-building
algorithm in Tor. In order to obtain communication paths with good per-
formance, the Tor implementation prefers onion routers with a good perfor-
mance. Therefore, an attacker only needs to insert few onion routers with
high performance in order to have a good chance that both the first and
the last onion router on the communication path are under his control. The
fact that Tor builds a new communication path every minute additionally
increases the chance that the attacker is able to reveal a communication link.
4.4 Conclusion
This section showed that all protocols, where both endpoints of a commu-
nication are observable by an attacker, are vulnerable to traffic analysis at-
tacks. These attacks are based mainly on statistical analysis of captured
traffic information, such as the number of packets sent or received by a
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node. By combining different observations over an extended period of time,
the attacker is able to reveal communication links. These passive attacks can
be made more effective by combining them with active attacks, i.e. attacks
where the attacker actively manipulates traffic and parts of the network.
The DC-net protocol is not affected by most of these traffic analysis
attacks, because the attacker is not able to detect the endpoints of the com-
munication; only communication pattern attacks have a chance of success.
However, DC-nets have some specific weaknesses, such as the reservation of
communication slots and the superposed sending. Because of the anonymous
sending, it is hard to detect disrupting attackers. The techniques presented
for the detection of disrupters introduce a chance for the attacker to reveal
the sender of a message.
To summarize, the weakness of the presented proxy-based protocols is
that the attacker gains information about the communication links by ob-
serving the communication. In DC-net, he might only be able to detect
communication patterns, but there also exist specific attacks on DC-nets.
The other problem of DC-nets is the poor scalability, which makes them
unsuitable for most communication scenarios.
The following chapter introduces a new protocol for unlinkable commu-
nication, where passive observations provide no information about the com-
munication link.
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Chapter 5
Unlinkable Communication
This chapter builds on the work described in [13, 14, 11, 15]. There exist sev-
eral protocols that claim to offer sender or receiver anonymity, which implies
unlinkability of sender and receiver. We presented these protocols in Chapter
3. As we have seen in the previous Chapter 4, these protocols have serious
weaknesses. The proxy-based approaches suffer from the fact that the end
points of a communication are visible to a strong passive attacker. Therefore,
it is possible to apply traffic analysis attacks to this type of protocol. In the
dining cryptographers protocol, these attacks are not applicable. However,
besides the fact that this protocol is very inefficient, it also introduces new
flaws due to the need for round reservation. The attacker is either able to
attack the round reservation directly or he can attack the countermeasures
to these attacks.
To overcome the problems in the presented protocols, this section intro-
duces an improved protocol for unlinkable communication. In this protocol,
the attacker is able to detect the nodes that are sending messages, but not
the nodes that are receiving messages. Consequently, he is not able to ap-
ply traffic analysis attacks to this protocol. By using efficient cryptographic
techniques, we can minimize the delay due to the use of the protocol. The
message overhead is minimal with respect to the minimum guaranteed degree
of receiver anonymity attained. We will prove that the protocol presented in
this chapter offers unbreakable unlinkability under the presence of a strong
passive attacker who is able to observe any transmission in the network. This
is because the attacker is not able to infer additional information concerning
the communication link by observation.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: in the first part of this
chapter we introduce the protocol for unlinkable communication. The second
part consists of a security analysis of the protocol. We prove that the attacker
is not able to break the unlinkability by passive observation of network traffic.
Finally, we show how to apply the protocol in practice.
5.1 Protocol
In this section we introduce a protocol for unlinkable communication for
which we can prove that a strong passive attacker is not able to break the
unlinkability and receiver anonymity. The major components of the protocol
are published in [14, 11, 15]. We assume that the network topology is known
to the user, i.e. every user has enough information to build a route to any
destination node. In Internet scenarios this can easily be managed by a ded-
icated directory service (e.g. a central server), but P2P techniques are also
applicable. We also assume that all nodes own a pair of public and private
keys and that the public keys are accessible to other users of the network.
This work does not discuss how this may be realized. These asymmetric
keys will be used for secret key-exchange. We do not use the Diffie-Hellman
key-exchange [87] for key-exchange because the protocol is susceptible to
man-in-the-middle attacks. To keep the computational overhead small, we
use efficient symmetric encryption during the communication phase.
Our protocol is based primarily on layered encryption, which is used while
sending messages over a path made up of several routers. The destination of
the communication is not at the end to the path, as it is in Tor for example,
but at a random point on the communication path. In Figure 5.1 the receiver
node Nt is placed at the fourth position on the path. The other nodes on the
path are also users of the protocol. This means that an attacker is not able to
map source and destination of a communication by traffic analysis attacks.
Indeed, we can prove that an attacker is not able to obtain any information
about the communication link while observing the network communication,
given the assumption that the nodes on the path are chosen properly. In this
chapter we denote the sending node by N1, the receiving node by Nt and the
last node on the communication path by Nt+e, where the indices represent
the position on the path.
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Figure 5.1: Communication path
In Section 5.1.1, we describe the protocol for exchanging the symmet-
ric keys on the communication path. Following this, we detail the protocol
for communication. We also introduce functionality for reverse communi-
cation, i.e. where the destination node sends reply messages to the source
node. Finally, we give rules for the selection of communication paths. This
is important because bad selections can leak information about the commu-
nication links.
5.1.1 Key-exchange
Because our protocol for unlinkable communication uses layered encryption,
we have to distribute keys among the nodes on the communication path. We
have assumed that every node on the communication path owns a pair of
public and private keys, where the public keys are accessible by other users
of the protocol. This work does not discuss the key distribution method.
Details of this topic can be found for example in [88].
The key-exchange process is initiated by the node N1 when it wants to
send a message to the destination node Nt. N1 generates secret keys Ki and
seeds Si for the generation of additional secret keys, 2 ≤ i ≤ t + e, for all
nodes on the path. As well as generating these keys, N1 randomly chooses
channel identifiers Ci, which are used to identify communication channels
while sending data messages. N1 needs to store these values for all nodes on
the path in order to build communication messages.
Having generated these values, N1 can build the key-exchange message.
It first builds the message Mt+e by encrypting the concatenation of the
identifier IDt+e of the last node on the path Nt+e and the secret key Kt+e
with the public key PKt+e of Nt+e. N1 also appends the channel identifier
Ct+e, the seed for generating additional secret keys Si and a flag Fend, that
indicates that the end node has been reached, encrypted with the secret key
Kt+e to this encryption. This results in the following message for Mt+e:
Mt+e := [IDt+e,Kt+e]PKt+e [Ct+e, St+e, Fend]Kt+e
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The messages Mi for 2 ≤ i ≤ t + e − 1 are recursively constructed by
encrypting the identifier IDi and the secret key Ki with the public key PKi.
The concatenation of the channel identifier Ci, the seed Si, the identifier of
the next node on the path IDi+1 and Mi+1 is encrypted with the secret key
Ki. Both ciphertexts are concatenated to produce the message Mi:
Mi := [IDi,Ki]PKi [Ci, Si, IDi+1,Mi+1]Ki
Node N1 now sends the key-exchange message M2 to N2. N2 decrypts
the first part [ID2,K2]PK2 of the message M2 with its private key SK2.
If N2 is able to decrypt this part correctly, the identifier ID2 matches its
own identifier. It uses the secret key K2 to decrypt the rest of the message,
which contains the channel identifier C2, the seed S2, the node identifier of
the next node ID3 and the message for that node M3. The identifier of the
predecessor node IDi−1, successor node IDi+1, the secret key K2, the seed
S2 and the channel identifier C2 are stored by the node N2. In addition
to the channel identifier, N2 stores a counter MC2 and initializes it to 0.
During the communication, N2 also stores a secret key that is derived from
a pseudo-random number generator. The generated secret key is used only
to decrypt a single message. N1 and N2 synchronize these one-time secret
keys by using the message counter MC2. The one-time secret key related
to the message counter MCi is denoted by KMCi . This message counter
and the one-time secret key are used to prevent attackers from replaying
messages on the path. The process of decrypting, processing and forwarding
messages is repeated until the message Mt+e is processed by the last node
on the path Nt+e. The flag Fend indicates that the message reached the end
of the path and does not need to be forwarded. By this stage N1 has shared
secret keys, seeds, channel identifiers and message counters with all nodes
on the communication path.
We use fixed packet lengths for the key-exchange messages in order to
prevent an attacker from receiving any information concerning the position
of a particular node on the path, by eavesdropping on its messages. This
will not help to increase the unlinkability in the presence of a strong passive
attacker that is able to observe every communication in the network; how-
ever, it complicates the analysis for weaker attackers. To keep a constant
message size for the key-exchange message, we add dummy bits at the end
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of the message each time a layer of encryption is removed. If block ciphers,
such as AES [89] or DES [90], or one-time pads [90] are used for symmetric
encryption, these dummy bits will not affect the encryption of the rest of the
message.
5.1.2 Communication
In order to send data messages from node N1 to Nt, a communication path
has to be established by means of a key-exchange message. Following such a
key-exchange message, N1 shares a secret key Ki, the seed Si for generating
additional secret keys, a channel identifier Ci and a message counter MCi
with every node Ni, 2 ≤ i ≤ t+ e, on the communication path.
For sending data D to the destination node Nt, node N1 wraps D in a
data message using layered encryption. We split the building of this data
messages into two parts: first, we show how the path information is wrapped
into the message; then, we show how the data part is layer-encrypted. The
concatenation of these two parts results in the data message.
The building of the path information of the data message starts with the
end node. First, we build the encryption of the message counter MCt+e and
the channel identifier Ct+e as the initial path information part Pt+e of the
message:
Pt+e := [MCt+e, Ct+e]Kt+e
To this path information, we recursively add the identifier Ci and counter
MCi and encrypt it with the secret keys Ki for all 2 ≤ i < t+ e:
Pi := [MCi, Ci]Ki [Pi+1]Ki
When using a block cipher such as AES and DES, the message counter
and the channel identifier should be in the same encryption block. The reason
for this is to prevent an observing attacker from simply linking messages to
one communication by comparing the path information parts of the messages.
By inserting the incrementing message counter, the encryption of the path
information changes when sending different messages over the same path.
The data part of the message is also layer-encrypted, but starting with
the one-time secret key KMCt of the target node Nt. The initial message
70
also contains a flag Fdest that indicates that the message has reached the
target node. It is built as follows:
Dt := [Fdest, D]KMCt
For 2 ≤ i < t the data message is built with:
Di := [Di+1]KMCi
Given these two parts, the messageMi can be built by concatenating the
path information Pi and the data part Di:
Mi := Pi, Di
N1 builds the message M2 and sends it to node N2. Every node Ni for
2 ≤ i ≤ t+ e that receives a message Mi first opens the initial part of Pi by
decrypting [MCi, Ci]Ki with its secret key Ki. Ni processes the rest of the
message only if the channel identifier matches that stored locally at Ni and
the message counter MCi in the message is greater than the locally stored
counter. This message counter is used to prevent an attacker from replaying
messages. Additionally, Ni is able to synchronize the one-time secret key
KMCi with N1. It decrypts the remainder of Pi with its secret key, yielding
Pi+1 and the data part Di, with the synchronized one-time secret key KMCi ,
which results in Di+1. Ni uses these parts to build the new message Mi+1
and forwards this message to the successor node.
When the message reaches the destination node Nt, the decryption of D1
contains the flag Fdest which indicates that the destination node has been
reached. The content of the message is now in plaintext. In this case, Nt
builds Di+1 by taking random bits. All nodes Ni for 2 ≤ i < t + e forward
the new message Mi+1 that contains Pi+1 and Di+1 to the next node on the
path Ni+1. The end node Nt+e discards the message.
In the same manner as for the key-exchange, we can arrange a fixed
packet length during the communication. First, we have to limit the amount
of data D that can be sent with one data message. We can fix the length
of the message parts Pi and Di by adding dummy bits, in order that they
reach a constant length. If block ciphers or one-time pads are used, these
dummy bits do not influence the rest of the encryption.
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5.1.3 Response Channel
With the basic communication protocol only communication from node N1
to Nt is possible. Here, we present a procedure for sending messages back
from node Nt to N1, while keeping the destination node Nt anonymous.
The response channel is based on a ticket system, where node N1 gener-
ates tickets for response messages. A ticket in our case is basically a blank
data message that is filled with the response by Nt. It is sent on the path
over Nt to Nt+e and bounced back to N1. All other nodes perform the same
actions as before: they check the message’s channel identifier and message
counter; they decrypt the rest of the message and forward it to the next node
on the path. An attacker is not able to distinguish between such a ticket
and a normal data message, and because of the layered encryption, he is not
able to detect when Nt replaces the blank message with its reply.
Again, we split the message into two parts, a path and a data part. The
path part of the ticket message is recursively built starting with the path
B which goes from Nt+e to N1. In order to receive messages, N1 needs to
generate a secret key K1, a seed S1, a channel identifier C1 and a message
counter MC1. With this information N1 can build the message for reverse
communication starting with B1 and ending with Bt+e−1 with:
B1 := [MC1, C1]K1
Bi := [MCi, Ci]Ki [Pi−1]Ki
where 2 ≤ i < t + e. The whole path part is constructed in a similar
manner to a common communication message starting with Pt+e and ending
with P2:
Pt+e := [MCt+e, Ct+e]Kt+e [Bt+e−1]Kt+e
Pi := [MCi, Ci]Ki [Pi+1]Ki
where 2 ≤ i < t+ e.
The data part is built in the same way as a data message. The only
difference is the flag Fticket that indicates that this is a ticket that can be
used for sending a response. The data only consists of dummy bits Ddummy:
Dt := [Fticket, Ddummy]KMCt
Di := [Di+1]KMCi
for 2 ≤ i < t+ e.
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N1 sends the ticket message M2, built by the concatenation of P2 and
D2, to N2. All nodes Ni process the message Mi in the same way as for
data message. The only exception is Nt, which unwraps the last layer of
encryption of the data part. The flag Fticket indicates that Nt can put its
response Dresponse encrypted with the one-time secret key KMCt in the data
field. The data part of the resulting message is:
Dt+1 := [Dresponse]KMCt
Nt forwards the message Mt+1 along the path to the end node Nt+e. All
nodes on the way to the end node perform the same actions as before: They
decrypt both the data and the path part of the message and forward the new
message to the successor node. By decrypting the path part of the message
the end node knows that the message has to be bounced back to N1. For
this Nt+e uses the path field Bt+e−1 to send back the message.
Mt+e+1 := Bt+e−1, Dt+e+1
All nodes that receive the backwards message forward the message back
along the path until M2·(t+e)−1 reaches N1. To obtain the data Dresponse
that was sent by Nt, N1 has to unwrap all layers of encryption starting using
the one-time secret keys KMC2 through KMCt+e then back to KMCt .
There are basically two different ways to allow for multiple reverse mes-
sages being sent in response to a single forward message. We present two
ways to implement this feature: in the first approach, node N1 constantly
sends ticket messages to Nt until Nt sends a message back that indicates
the end of the transmission. The advantage of this approach is that there is
practically no delay after the first reply message has been received. In the
second approach, Nt includes a flag in the response message that indicates
the need for a new ticket. An advantage of this approach is that the amount
of replay messages sent is minimized.
Unlinkability and receiver anonymity during backwards communication
are guaranteed by the use of layered encryption, which ensures that the
appearance of the message changes at every communication hop. As a result,
the attacker is not able to detect when the dummy message is replaces by
the response. Because all nodes perform the same calculations, the timing of
packets at every node is basically the same. The only difference is that node
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Nt also has to prepare the response message. We can counter this problem
by first sending an announcement to Nt so that it has time to prepare the
response in advance.
5.1.4 Path Selection
As defined in Section 2.2, we assume that the attacker knows the system be-
ing used. For this reason, we assume that the attacker knows the algorithm
for choosing the nodes on the path, which builds the unlinkability set and
the receiver anonymity set. The example of Tor highlights the dangers that
can arise when choosing nodes. The attack of Bauer et al. [49] exploits the
mechanism of Tor which tries to choose high-performance Tor nodes for com-
munication. By inserting only few Tor nodes with high performance under
the control of the attacker, he has a good chance of inferring communication
links.
In order to avoid these kind of attacks a good protocol should not prefer
any nodes’ property, such as high performance. In the case of Tor, the Tor
nodes are only relays but cannot be users of the system. In contrast, in our
protocol all these nodes can be the destination of a communication. For this
reason, all nodes on the path, including the end node, should be equally
likely to be the destination of the communication. If this is not the case, the
attacker might be able to map the source to the destination by reproducing
the communication path. We identify the following criteria which an attacker
might use to group the nodes:
• Services offered by the nodes
• Performance of nodes
• Location of the nodes in the network
In the first case, different services might result in different traffic patterns.
An attacker might map these traffic patterns back to a special service. If only
a subset of the nodes on the path offers this service, the attacker can reduce
the receiver anonymity set and unlinkability set to these nodes. In the second
case, if only high-performance nodes are used to build communication paths,
the attacker can identify the destination node if this is the only node with
lower performance. And finally, in the case of ad hoc networks, the location
of nodes can give additional clues concerning the identity of the receiver. To
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prevent this information from reducing the degree of unlinkability, the path
has to be chosen in such a way that the nodes on the path are similar with
respect to services offered, performance and location.
If we assume that the nodes on the path are selected such that the prob-
ability of selection is equal for all nodes in the network, we can calculate the
information that the attacker obtains by observation. We define n as the
number of nodes in the network and t + e as the length of the path over
which the sender sends messages to the target node. With these parame-
ters we can calculate how much information about the target node Nt ∈ N
a strong passive attacker can maximally receive if he knows the complete
path pi ∈ P beginning at the sender node N1 ∈ N and ending at the
last node Nt+e. Let E(P ) = {e(p1), . . . , e(pu)} be the event set of P and
E(N) = {e(N1), · · · , e(Nn)} the event set of N .
IE(P ),E(N)(e(pi); e(Nt)) = log2
P (e(Nt)|e(pi))
P (e(Nt))
log2
1
n
1
t+e
= log2
t+e
n .
If all nodes of the network belong to the communication path, that is, if
t+ e = n, the attacker receives no information on the target node.
If we use the definition of Section 2.1.3 and restrict the unlinkability set
to the nodes in pi, then the probability of any node Ni being the target node
is P (e(Ni)) = 1p . As a result, the degree of unlinkability and the degree of
receiver unlinkability is log2 p. For the calculations we have assumed that
the probability of being the destination node is the same for all nodes in the
network. If the attacker has previous knowledge that helps to adjust these
probabilities, obviously the degree of unlinkability and receiver anonymity
decreases. In any case, the attacker receives no additional information by
observing the execution of the protocol other than by being able to identify
the nodes on the communication path.
To avoid intersection attacks (see Section 4.1.1), i.e. attacks where the
attacker intersects two different communications, there must be no paths
that share same nodes. The set of nodes on a communication path has to be
disjunct to the sets of all other communication paths. From this it follows
that for sending several messages to the same destination node Nt the same
communication path pi has to be used. Additionally, for all other nodes Nj
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that appear on this communication path pi, the same communication path
pi has to be used if N1 wants to send a message to one of the nodes Ni.
For sending messages from Nt back to N1, only the response channel
described in Section 5.1.3 must be used. If Nt breaks this rule by building a
new path for sending messages to N1 the attacker might be able to intersect
both communications.
We can implement these constraints on the building of communication
paths for Internet communication by choosing the nodes on the communi-
cation path randomly, and by using existing communication paths if the
destination node already appears on one of them. For P2P communication
the communication path can also be chosen randomly. However, we can-
not easily implement this mechanism for ad hoc communication. Because
the nodes might have no direct communication links to other nodes, the
messages would have to be routed over additional intermediate nodes. This
would cause longer communication paths, with not all nodes on the com-
munication path contributing to the unlinkability set. What is more, longer
communication paths give a higher chance of transmission errors. One way to
implement an equal-probability choice of nodes in such a scenario is by first
choosing the shortest path from source to destination and then expanding
this path by appending nodes until it reaches a fixed length. The applica-
tion of the protocol in different scenarios will be discussed in more detail in
Section 5.3.
5.2 Analysis
In this section we give an analysis of the protocol for unlinkability and re-
ceiver anonymity that was described in Section 5.1. In the first part, we
measure the performance of the protocol, which is composed of the induced
message overhead and the computational overhead due to cryptographic
functions.
An analysis of the unlinkability and receiver anonymity follows in the
second part. We show that a strong passive attacker is able to detect which
nodes belong to the communication path. Provided that the protocol is
used properly, the attacker is not able determine which of these nodes is the
destination node.
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5.2.1 Performance
We separate the analysis of performance of the protocol into two parts: in
the first part, we analyze the message overhead, i.e. how many additional
messages are sent during the communication. The second part consists of an
analysis of computational overhead by use of a prototype implementation of
the protocol.
Message overhead
The protocol entails message overhead by exchanging symmetric keys through
the use of a key-exchange message and during the communication because
the messages are sent over the complete communication path, which gener-
ally extends beyond the intended destination node. In the following, we give
details of the message overhead.
Key-exchange Key-exchange messages are sent only once for a commu-
nication path. Before the communication starts, the sending node N1 builds
a key-exchange message and sends this message hop by hop over all nodes
on the communication path. Therefore, if the path consists of l nodes, an
additional l messages must be sent.
The size of the key-exchange message depends on the algorithms used
for the symmetric and asymmetric encryptions and also on the length of the
communication path. In our prototype we use RSA with public key length of
162 bytes and private key length of 635 bytes for asymmetric encryption. If
the messages are encrypted with the public key this results in a block length
of 128 bytes. For a path of length l, the protocol generates a key-exchange
message of length l ∗ 128 bytes.
Communication phase For Internet communication, we are able to send
the message directly to the destination node. Therefore, if instead we build
a path over l − 1 other nodes, the message overhead during communication
is l− 1. Together with the key-exchange, this results in a message overhead
of l+ i · (l− 1) messages when N1 sends i messages to the destination node.
Because l is constant and the unlinkability set consists of l members at a path
length of l the message overhead increases linearly with the unlinkability set.
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For other scenarios, where some of the nodes that are used to build the
unlinkability set are necessary in order to connect to the destination node,
such as in ad hoc communication, the message overhead decreases. But, in
the worst case, the message overhead is still linear.
In all communication settings, the overall message overhead is in O(l),
where l is the size of the unlinkability set.
We can prove that this message overhead cannot be bettered if receiver
anonymity is to be achieved.
Theorem 1. Under the assumption that a strong passive attacker is able
to observe every communication in the network, it is not possible to achieve
a degree of receiver anonymity of log2 l or better by sending fewer than l
messages.
Proof. We prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume that there is a pro-
tocol, that needs n < l messages to achieve a degree of receiver anonymity
of at least log2 l. From this it follows that fewer than l nodes in the network
receive a message. Because the attacker is able to observe every communi-
cation in the network, he detects all n nodes that received a message. All
other nodes in the network did not receive any message, so that the attacker
is able to remove these nodes from the receiver anonymity set. As result
the receiver anonymity set consists of only n < l nodes. It follows that the
degree of receiver anonymity is d ≤ log2 n < log2 l, which contradicts the
assumption.
Computational overhead
We measure the computational overhead with the help of a prototype imple-
mentation of the protocol. The prototype was implemented in Java. We use
AES with a key length of 16 bytes for the symmetric encryption, and RSA
with a private key length of 635 bytes and public key length of 162 bytes.
The reference hardware was a Dell Latitude D610 Laptop with a 2GHz Intel
Pentium M processor, 1GByte main memory and Windows XP SP2. To
evaluate the computational overhead, we measure the time required to gen-
erated and process key-exchange and communication messages. We average
the results over 104 runs.
Firstly, we measure the performance of a key-exchange. Figure 5.2 shows
how long it takes to generate and to process a key-exchange message. The
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Figure 5.2: Performance of key-exchange
time required to generate a key-exchange message strongly depends on the
length of the path, because the sending node has to perform one asymmetric
encryption and one symmetric encryption for each node on the path. The
growth of the time for generating key-exchange messages is nearly linear. The
reason for this is that, if we add one node to the path, the sending node has to
perform exactly one more asymmetric encryption and it also has to encrypt
the body of the message symmetrically. In contrast to the generation of a
key-exchange message, the processing does not increase noticeably when the
communication path increases. All nodes only encrypt a small constant part
of the message asymmetrically. As the communication paths become longer
only the body of a key-exchange message grows linearly. For the body of
the key-exchange message the nodes use efficient symmetric encryption with
the exchanged keys while the part that has to be decrypted asymmetrically
keeps constant. Therefore, the duration to process a key-exchange message
does not grow significantly. In our measurements, the time to process a key-
exchange is nearly constant. It increases linearly from 10.406 ms at a path
length of 3 up to 10.432 ms at a path length of 12.
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Figure 5.3: Performance of communication
In the same way, the time to generate a communication message increases
when the communication path becomes longer. For the measurements in
Figure 5.3, we assume a communication message with 1 KByte of data.
The sending node encrypts the message using symmetric encryption once
for every node on the path. The message itself only grows by 16 bytes if
the communication path grows by one node. For that reason the time taken
to generate a communication message is nearly linear in the length of the
communication path. The processing of a communication message grows
only slowly. Because the communication messages grow by 16 bytes for each
node on the path, there is a minimal increase in the time that is needed for
decryption. In our measurements the duration grows linearly from 0.066 ms
for a path of 3 nodes up to 0.086 ms for a path of 12 nodes.
Figure 5.4 shows the throughput that the prototype implementation
achieved during the measurements. To illustrate these values, we compare
them with the throughput in non-anonymous Internet and wireless commu-
nication. In the case of Internet communication, the bottleneck is at the
end-user side. Download rates in Germany are, at the time of writing this
thesis, up to 32 MBit/sec and upload rates up to 1 MBit/sec (see e.g. [91]).
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Figure 5.4: Throughput during communication
At a path length of 6, the throughput for generating communication mes-
sages falls below the theoretical best throughput of ADSL downloads, while
the processing of messages always has better throughput. On the other hand,
the throughput while uploading data with ADSL is always smaller than that
for generating and processing messages.
For the ad hoc scenario, we compare the throughput of the protocol with
the throughput of a WLAN. The common IEEE 802.11g WLAN standard
[92], with a link rate of 54 MBit/sec, offers a maximal real throughput of 5.6
MByte/sec for one-hop communication. For multi-hop communication, the
maximum throughput falls to one half for two-hop communication and one
third for more than two-hops [93] (as in Figure 5.4). Even at a path length
of 12, the protocol offers a better throughput for processing communication
messages than can be transmitted over a WLAN. In our measurements the
throughput of generating communication messages falls below the theoretical
maximum throughput of WLAN at a minimum path length of 10.
In summary, the performance of the protocol is sufficient for use in the
scenarios presented.
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5.2.2 Proof of Unlinkability
The basic premise of the proof of unlinkability for the protocol presented
is that the attacker receives no information about the communication links,
except the identity of the nodes belonging to the receiver anonymity set and
unlinkability set, while passively observing the execution of the protocol. To
back this up we check whether any observable event o ∈ O, the set of all
observable events, reveals information that helps to detect communication
links. Let e(pi) be the event ‘pi is the communication path’, e(li,j) the event
‘there is a communication link between node Ni and Nj ’, and e(Ni) the event
‘Ni is the destination node’.
Theorem 2. Our protocol guarantees for all observable events o ∈ O and
all communication links li,j ∈ L that
∀
li,j∈L
∀
ol∈O
IE(L),O(e(li,j); ol) = 0,
if the attacker already knows the corresponding receiver anonymity set and
unlinkability set.
Proof. The following events can be observed by a passive attacker: By ob-
serving sending and receiving events, the attacker can infer information on
who sends and receives a message, how many messages are sent and re-
ceived and when the messages are sent and received. Coding information
and the size of a message can offer additional information. Traffic patterns,
i.e. special characteristics of network traffic, can be captured if the network
is observed over a period of time. Using these observations, the attacker tries
to reveal communication links. One basic technique is to combine different
observations and statistically reveal communication links. In the following,
we show the influence of these techniques on the knowledge of the attacker.
We assumed in Section 5.1.4 that the nodes on the path must be selected
in such a way, that they are all equally likely to be the destination of the
communication. So, for a communication path of p nodes, the probability
for all nodes Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, to be the destination node Nt is P (e(Ni)) = 1p .
When the attacker is able to detect who is sending and receiving messages he
is able to reduce the unlinkability set to the nodes on the path. We assume
that the attacker identifies the source node and tries to find the destination of
the communication. For a communication path pu with p nodes, containing
82
the nodes pu = {N1, · · · , Np}, he can reduce the unlinkability set in the best
case to the nodes in pu. For a network of n nodes, the attacker maximally
receives the following amount of information on the destination node Nt of
a communication:
IE(N),E(P )(e(Nt); e(pu)) = log2
P (e(Nt)|e(pu))
P (e(Nt))
= log2
1
p
1
n
= log2
n
p .
Perfect unlinkability can be reached with this protocol if all nodes of the
network belong to the communication path. If this is the case the attacker
receives no information on the communication link while passively observing
the network traffic.
In the following we proof that traffic analysis attacks do not affect the
unlinkability offered by the protocol.
Lemma 1. The protocol for unlinkable communication is secure against
packet counting attacks.
Proof. If the attacker is not able to observe the complete communication
the number of sending and receiving events can help to map different nodes
to one communication. We showed details of attacks that make use of such
observations in Section 4. In the best case, the attacker is able to find all
nodes Ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ p that are on the communication path by counting
the packets at every node, but is not able to detect the destination node Nt.
This is because the packet counts ci are the same at every node Ni if no other
communication interferes the counting, i.e. the packet count is independent
of the fact that Nt is the destination of the communication. With e(ci) as
the event ‘the attacker observes the packet count ci’ we have:
P (e(Nt)|e(c1), · · · , e(cp)) = P (e(Nt)).
From this it follows that the mutual information of the identity of Nt and
the packet counts ci, under the assumption that the attacker already knows
the nodes of the communication path, is:
IE(N),E(C)(e(Nt); e(ci)) = 0.
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Lemma 2. The protocol for unlinkable communication is secure against tim-
ing attacks.
Proof. In the same way as for packet counts, the attacker can use the timing
of packets in order to map nodes to a communication link. By this method,
he is also able to find all nodes on the communication path. During the
key-exchange and the forward communication, all nodes perform the same
calculations before they forward the message to the next node on the path.
The time delay ti for forwarding a packet on the path is in this case inde-
pendent of the identity of Nt. During backwards communication, the target
node also performs the same computations. The difference is that it also has
to prepare the response message. We counter this problem by first sending an
announcement to Nt so that it has time to prepare the response in advance.
When Nt receives the ticket, the computations are the same as for all other
nodes on the path. Let e(ti) be the event ‘the attacker measured the time ti
between the receiving and sending of a message’. When the attacker already
knows the communication path, the mutual information of the timings ti
and the identity of Nt is also:
IE(N),E(T )(e(Nt); e(ti)) = 0.
Lemma 3. The size, content and the coding of messages sent during the
execution of the protocol for unlinkable communication do not reveal any
information about the communication link.
Proof. We have assumed that a fixed packet size s is used for the key-
exchange and the communication messages. Therefore, the mutual infor-
mation of the packet size si and the identity of the destination node Nt is
0.
Because of the layered encryption, the attacker has no information on
the content of the messages. In the best case, he can distinguish between
key-exchange and communication messages, because of the use of asymmet-
ric encryption in the key-exchange message. However, the communication
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messages and the key-exchange messages are sent over the complete com-
munication path. As a consequence, these messages offer no information as
to whether a node on the path is the destination node or not. For both
key-exchange and communication messages, layered encryption prevents an
attacker from receiving any information about the content of the messages as
this changes at every communication hop. It follows that the attacker is also
unable to detect when Nt replaces a ticket message with the response during
the reverse communication. Hence, coding of messages offers no information
on the communication links.
Lemma 4. The protocol for unlinkable communication is secure against com-
munication pattern attacks.
Proof. Distinctive traffic patterns, i.e. special characteristics of traffic in-
duced by protocols, can be detected even if the communication is encrypted.
By using traffic patterns, the attacker can reduce the set of possible desti-
nation nodes to the ones that offer the service, that exhibits such a traffic
pattern. As we assumed in Section 5.1.4, all nodes on the communication
path should offer the same services asNt, so that the observed traffic patterns
match all nodes’ services. If the attacker already knows the communication
path and all these nodes offer the service, he receives no information on the
destination node.
As result, the attacker receives no information about the communication
link by passive observation.
Our protocol does not prevent the attacker from passively observing the
communication and needs no additional dummy traffic to hide the traffic.
The basis of unlinkability of this protocol is that, in the best case, all possible
observations only allow the identification of the nodes on the communication
path. However, they offer no information on which of the nodes on the
communication path is the destination node. Therefore, the best passive
attacker is able only to reduce the unlinkability set to the p nodes on the
path, resulting in a degree of unlinkability of at least log2 p.
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5.3 Practical Considerations
In this section we will show how the protocol can be used in practice. Details
on the application of the protocol vary when applying it to different appli-
cation scenarios. In particular, the method of choosing the communication
path can be different because direct communication links between all users
of the network do not exist in all scenarios. For example, in ad hoc networks
all nodes also act as routers by forwarding messages for other users. As a
demonstration, we will adapt the protocol for usage in Internet settings, such
as for web browsing or P2P communication, and for ad hoc communication.
We built an prototype implementation of the protocol, but refrained from
applying it to the scenarios presented in this section. The reason for this is
that we wanted to concentrate on the essential functionalities of the protocol.
Applying it in these scenarios would introduce problems which are not due
to the protocol itself.
5.3.1 Application to Internet Settings
In Internet settings, we can assume that all nodes are pairwise connected,
so that it is possible to send messages directly between arbitrary nodes. We
can ignore the fact that there are stations on the path between two nodes
that belong to the infrastructure of the network.
To apply the protocol to web browsing it is a prerequisite that the tar-
get server and additional other servers are able to execute the protocol. If
this is the case the sending node N1 can select randomly the nodes for the
communication path from the list of available servers. As was shown in the
previous Section 5.2.2, if this is done randomly, the attacker is not able to
discover any information by knowing the nodes on the path. The addresses
of available servers can be published by means of servers in the Internet, or
by using P2P networks.
For the application of the protocol to P2P networks, all nodes that are
part of the P2P network execute the protocol and can be part of communi-
cation paths. N1 can choose these nodes randomly in the same way as for
web browsing.
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5.3.2 Application to Ad Hoc Communication
In ad hoc networks, it is also possible to choose random waypoints and route
all messages over these nodes. If there are no direct links between these
waypoints, the messages must be routed over several other nodes. As a
result, the path over n random nodes consists of totally n+ x nodes, where
x represents the nodes needed to connect the random waypoints. These x
nodes do not belong to the unlinkability set, because a strong attacker might
detect that they are not randomly located. Even if the attacker can detect
this, the protocol guarantees a degree of unlinkability of log2 n. However, the
more nodes are involved in the routing process, the greater is the cost and
the chance of loosing the connection. By minimizing the number of nodes
involved we can minimize the cost and maximize the robustness.
For route selection, it is important that all nodes that belong to the
unlinkability set have the same likelihood for being the target node. By
choosing the cheapest path from the sender node N1 to the target node Nt
we can satisfy this condition. As a consequence, if we assume positive costs
for each link, then the cost from N1 to all other nodes Ni, for 2 ≤ i < t, is
optimal. To reach the required size for the unlinkability set, and also to hide
the target node on the path, we extend the path to node Nt, so that for all
following nodes Ni, t+1 ≤ i ≤ t+ e, the resulting path N1 to Ni is optimal.
If we assume that the network topology is known to all nodes, the sender
node N1 can easily build the cheapest path to the target node Nt by using
the Dijkstra algorithm (see [94]). The Dijkstra algorithm initializes the cost
of all nodes to ∞ and the cost for N1 to 0. All nodes are declared as
active. In every step it takes the active node Ni with the cheapest cost
ci and path Pi from N1 to Ni, and checks for all outgoing edges e(Ni, Nj)
if ci + cost(e(Ni, Nj)) < cj . If this is the case it updates the cost cj to
ci + cost(e(Ni, Nj)) and Pj to Pi ∪Ni. Additionally, we store for each node
Ni the length li of the cheapest path in order to know if the desired size for
the unlinkability set is reached. After having checked all outgoing edges of
Ni we declare Ni as passive. The algorithm is repeated until the target node
Nt is the cheapest active node which means that Pt is the cheapest path
from N1 to Nt.
To extend the path only by nodes Ni so that the resulting path from
N1 to Ni is optimal we continue the Dijkstra algorithm in such a way, that
we mark all active nodes, whose cheapest path goes over Nt. The algorithm
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ends if a marked active node Ni is reached, whose path length li is equal to
the desired size of the unlinkability set or if there is no further active node
marked. In this case we choose the longest path with a marked end node. If
the length of this path is lk, we only have an unlinkability set of lk nodes.
Extending the path by nodes Ni, so that the path from N1 over Nt to Ni
is not optimal, does not increase the unlinkability set if we assume a strong
passive attacker who knows how the path is selected.
The limited number of nodes in communication range makes it easy for
an attacker to detect all nodes on the communication path. Even in this case,
the attacker is not able to detect the communication link. He is only able
to reduce the unlinkability set to only those nodes on the communication
path. A better degree of unlinkability can be attained if the attacker has no
knowledge of the complete communication path. In order to make it harder
to detect the path, we can additionally use a technique based on the DC-
net. This extension to the basic protocol for unlinkable communication is
published in [14, 15]. The main idea is to use DC-net communication with
limited group sizes for every one-hop communication step. This technique
makes it harder for the attacker to find communication links if he is able
only to observe traffic locally. A strong passive attacker is still able to map
traffic that belongs to one communication link.
5.4 Conclusion
The presented protocol for unlinkable communication hides the receiver node
on a communication path by the use of layered encryption. To keep the com-
putation cost of the protocol small we use efficient symmetric encryption
during the communication; less-efficient asymmetric encryption is only used
during the key-exchange phase, which is only needed once for every com-
munication path. We introduced a response channel, so that the receiver
node is able to send messages back to the sender node without revealing the
communication link. We proved that the attacker is not able to obtain any
information by passively observing network traffic.
The existing protocols for unlinkable communication presented in Chap-
ter 3 suffer from some weaknesses. The proxy-based approaches with Mix
networks and Tor offer good performance. Because the attacker can detect
sender and receiver nodes he has a good chance of discovering communica-
88
tion links even if he has only incomplete knowledge of the network traffic.
We eliminate this weakness in our protocol. Receiver nodes are indistin-
guishable from the nodes that are used to build the unlinkable set, while
it produces the same amount of traffic and computational overhead as Tor
and Mix networks. In addition to unlinkability of senders and receivers, our
protocol also offers receiver anonymity.
The dining cryptographers approach offers provable unlinkability that
relies on superposed sending and multicast sending. It is not used in prac-
tice because of several weaknesses. One of the main problems of DC-net is
its scalability. In order to increase the receiver anonymity set linearly, the
message overhead increases quadratically. Our protocol offers comparable re-
ceiver anonymity but at considerable lower cost. For both, DC-net and our
protocol the message overhead increases only linearly with the unlinkability
set.
The expected degree of unlinkability and receiver anonymity provided by
our protocol is higher than that for a DC-net. In most network settings,
an attacker is not able to observe the complete network traffic, decreasing
the chance of observing the complete communication path. In the DC-net
scenario, the attacker only needs to observe the traffic of one participant in
order to know all nodes of the unlinkability set because all messages are sent
to all participants of the DC-net group.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the conclusions and the main research contribu-
tions of this thesis. The aim of the thesis was to find a technique that
guarantees unlinkable and anonymous communication under the assumption
of a strong passive attacker. To reach this goal, we first introduced measures
for anonymity and unlinkability. For both measures we used the information
theoretic notion of entropy. This technique for measuring anonymity was
independently introduced by [9] and [10]. In order to measure unlinkability
we defined unlinkability sets, which consist of all possible communication
links. We used these measures throughout the thesis for evaluating different
approaches to anonymous and unlinkable communication.
We studied the state of the art in the area of anonymous and unlink-
able communication in Chapter 3. We called the first group of protocols
proxy-based, because their traffic is routed over other stations. The com-
mon feature of these approaches is that the communication end points can
be detected by an attacker. In Chapter 4 we showed how to exploit this
information for traffic analysis attacks. In this kind of attack, the attacker
tries to make deductions about the sender and receiver of messages simply by
passively observing the network traffic. First, we considered the case where
the attacker can infer information by passively observing the network. We
then looked at the cases where the attacker actively manipulates traffic or
part of the network in order to infer more information. We introduced slot-
ted packet-counting, a new passive attack that improves traditional packet-
counting attacks by taking account of the alteration of traffic load (see [12]).
By applying this attack to network traffic traces, we were able to demon-
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strate how to break existing protocols for anonymity and unlinkability. We
showed how the attack can be applied to different scenarios by optimizing
its detection rate.
The second group of protocols, those based on the dining cryptographers’
network, are not affected by passive attacks because no communication end
points are detectable. The reliable broadcast assumption and the poor scal-
ability have the result that the protocol is not used in practice. Additionally,
active attackers can disrupt the execution of the protocol, or break the ano-
nymity and unlinkability by chance.
In Chapter 5 we introduced a new protocol for unlinkable communication
that also guarantees receiver anonymity. It was published in [13, 14, 11, 15].
The design goal of the protocol was to prevent a passive attacker from ob-
taining any information through observation of the execution of the protocol.
The protocol attains this goal by building communication paths over several
nodes, with the destination node placed randomly on the communication
path. We were able to prove that by passive observation only, the attacker
has no chance of detecting the communication links. Furthermore, we were
able to prove that the message overhead of the protocol is optimal in guar-
anteeing receiver anonymity. We showed means of applying the protocol to
different communication settings, such as P2P communication and ad hoc
communication.
In the following, we critically review this thesis (Section 6.1). Finally, we
discuss open questions which might be interesting for further studies (Section
6.2).
6.1 Discussion and Critical Assessment
In this thesis we assumed a strong passive attacker who is able to observe
every communication. Under this assumption most existing protocols for
anonymous and unlinkable communication cannot guarantee anonymity and
unlinkability. They were designed under the assumption of weaker attacker
models, which are more realistic in Internet settings. For example JAP [95]
uses Mix cascades to hide the communication link. By distributing these
Mix servers geographically it is hard for an attacker to observe a complete
communication path. End-to-end mapping of communications is still possi-
ble; the distribution merely reduces the chance that an attacker can control
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or observe a sufficient number of servers to provide information about a com-
plete communication path. Previous knowledge can make attacks on these
protocols easier, e.g. initial suspicion that a particular communication link
is being used.
Most of the attacks presented can theoretically break the anonymity and
unlinkability of most protocols. Already some of these attacks have been suc-
cessfully applied in practice against protocols such as Tor. For most users
it is sufficient if no direct linking of sender and receiver is possible because
there is often no direct damage when unattributable communication is de-
tected. The cost of applying these attacks is sufficiently great so that only
few institutions are interested in performing them. On the other hand, the
loss in performance due to our protocol are similar to that of Tor. The dif-
ference is that, when our protocol is used no attacker can break unlinkability
by using passive observation.
We proved for our protocol presented in Chapter 5 that a passive attacker
is able to detect the unlinkability set, while only observing the traffic. We
have already mentioned that the attacker still might be able to detect com-
munication patterns even if the communication is encrypted. We assumed
that all nodes offer the same service, so that communication patterns might
be due to any of several different communication links. If it is not possible
to choose the nodes on the path in this way, additional dummy traffic can
hide communication patterns. Wright et al. [96] address this problem by
introducing traffic morphing where a class of traffic can be morphed to an-
other class of traffic. The optimal insertion method for dummy traffic might
be an interesting topic for further studies.
More generally, previous knowledge can give the attacker information
that helps to break anonymity and unlinkability. For example, if an attacker
knows that messages are sent more frequently to some nodes, he might be
able to decrease the degree of anonymity and unlinkability. This previous
knowledge is independent of the protocol used, because it is collected before
the use of the protocol. Further studies on how to prevent or detect previous
knowledge might be interesting.
Another problem is that every communication partner has to execute
the protocol. In some settings this is easy to implement, for example in
P2P networks, where every peer performs the same action and has similar
interests. In contrast, this is not the case for web browsing. In order to hide
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a users’ contact with a special server R, which hosts a web site, a commu-
nication path over different web servers including R must be constructed.
This requires that R and all servers on the communication path are able to
execute the protocol. Operators of servers have no incentive for providing
unlinkable communication. Indeed, the opposite is the case: most operators
of servers are interested in identifying their users. For those scenarios, in-
centives for executing the protocol have to be introduced. To do this, trust
and cooperation techniques can be applied. Further studies in this area are
needed.
We showed in Chapter 5 that the protocol offers receiver anonymity at
minimal cost. For this proof we assumed the strong passive attacker model.
In real-world settings, where an attacker has only partial knowledge of the
network, the degree of receiver anonymity is even higher.
6.2 Further Work
There are many fields for further investigation in the area of unlinkability
and anonymous communication. In relation to the protocol presented, it
is interesting to study the influence of previous knowledge, i.e. knowledge
that is not revealed during the execution of the protocol but nevertheless
decreases the degree of unlinkability or receiver anonymity. For example, if
some nodes have a higher probability of being the end point of a communi-
cation, the degrees of unlinkability and receiver anonymity decrease even if
the protocol leaks no additional information. The question here is whether
previous knowledge can be detected, e.g. with Trust techniques, and whether
it is possible to increase the degree of unlinkability and receiver anonymity
in these cases by applying additional techniques. One way could be to insert
additional dummy traffic in order to decrease previous knowledge. Applying
the measures for unlinkability and receiver anonymity can help to find nodes
in the network, where injecting directed dummy traffic could increase the
entropy with minimal cost. Such a technique would be also applicable to
other protocols.
In the presented protocol, the attacker is not able to obtain any informa-
tion by passive observation. If he controls some nodes of the communication
path he might be able to reduce the degree of unlinkability and receiver
anonymity. To detect these malicious nodes, trust techniques might be ap-
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plicable. Trust techniques are based on the idea of collecting information on
a subject of interest in order to estimate whether he is honest or malicious.
In order to apply it for our needs, the main task lies in the detection of
malicious behavior. This is a general problem for trust applications. In our
case the unlinkable and anonymous communication additionally complicates
the acquisition of information.
As we mentioned in the previous Section 6.1, one problem is that not
all nodes might be interested in participating in the unlinkability set. For
example, when using the protocol for web surfing, the web servers have no in-
centives for executing the protocol. One way to solve this problem would be
by using virtual currencies (see e.g. [97]), where the initiator of a communica-
tion pays to send messages anonymously. In P2P networks similar techniques
can be applied in order to prevent free-riders from using the protocol with-
out contributing to the unlinkability set for others’ communications (see e.g.
[98]). Further studies in applying these techniques for use in combination
with the protocol should be undertaken.
In this thesis, we have assumed a strong passive attacker who is able to
observe every communication in the network. The bounds we found during
our theoretical analysis for the degree of anonymity and unlinkability are
based on this attacker model. Weaker attackers might also be able to break
the anonymity and unlinkability of some protocols but in most cases the
degrees of anonymity and unlinkability increase as the attacker becomes
weaker. In our work we concentrated on the lower bound for anonymity
and unlinkability that is guaranteed by the protocol in the face of the most
powerful passive attacker possible. Further investigations could be made in
order to specify the expected degree of anonymity and unlinkability when
assuming more realistic attacker models.
94
Bibliography
[1] “The internet archive,” February 2009. http://www.archive.org.
[2] D. Presse-Agentur, “Ermittlungen wegen Daten-Diebstahl bei T-
Mobile vor Wiederaufnahme,” December 2008. http://www.heise.de/
newsticker/meldung/117035.
[3] “Steuer-Skandal - Informant enttarnt,” February 2008. http://www.
n-tv.de/921125.html.
[4] T. Online, “UK citizens’ private information being lost at record
rate,” February 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
politics/article5688347.ece.
[5] The Council of Europe, “Convention no. 108, Convention for the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal
data,” 1981.
[6] EU Commission, “Directive 2006/24/ec of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 15 march 2006,” Official Journal of the European
Union, vol. L 105/54, 2006.
[7] T. Online, “Taxman loses sensitive personal data on 25m peo-
ple,” November 2007. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/
article2907495.ece.
[8] J. Kuri, “Kriminalbeamte fordern zentrale Datenbank für Verbindungs-
daten,” December 2008. http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/
108497.
[9] A. Serjantov and G. Danezis, “Towards an information theoretic met-
ric for anonymity,” in Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies
95
Workshop (PET 2002) (R. Dingledine and P. Syverson, eds.), Springer-
Verlag, LNCS 2482, April 2002.
[10] C. Díaz, S. Seys, J. Claessens, and B. Preneel, “Towards measuring an-
onymity,” in Proceedings of Privacy Enhancing Technologies Workshop
(PET 2002), April 2002.
[11] V. Fusenig, E. Staab, U. Sorger, and T. Engel, “Unlinkable commu-
nication,” in Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference on Privacy,
Security and Trust (PST2008), (Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada),
pp. 51–55, October 1-3 2008.
[12] V. Fusenig, E. Staab, U. Sorger, and T. Engel, “Slotted packet count-
ing attacks on anonymity protocols,” in Proceedings of the 7th Aus-
tralasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2009) (L. Brankovic
and W. Susilo, eds.), vol. 98 of CRPIT, (Wellington, New Zealand),
ACS, 2009.
[13] V. Fusenig, D. Spiewak, and T. Engel, “Acimn protocol: A proto-
col for anonymous communication in multi hop wireless networks,” in
IEEE Wireless Telecommunications Symposium (WTS 2007), April 26-
28 2007, IEEE, IEEE, April 2007.
[14] V. Fusenig, D. Spiewak, and T. Engel, “Acimn: A protocol for anony-
mous communication in multi hop wireless networks,” in Proceedings
of the Sixth Australasian Information Security Conference (AISC 2008)
(L. Brankovic and M. Miller, eds.), vol. 81 of CRPIT, (Wollongong,
NSW, Australia), pp. 107–114, ACS, 2008.
[15] V. Fusenig, D. Spiewak, and T. Engel, “Anonymous communication
in multi hop wireless networks,” Journal of Research and Practice in
Information Technology, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 205–224, 2008.
[16] M. Rehak, E. Staab, V. Fusenig, J. Stiborek, M. Grill, K. Bartos, M. Pe-
choucek, and T. Engel, “Threat-model-driven runtime adaptation and
evaluation of intrusion detection system,” in Proceedings of the 6th In-
ternational Conference on Autonomic Computing and Communications,
(Barcelona, Spain), June 2009.
96
[17] E. Staab, V. Fusenig, and T. Engel, “Towards trust-based acquisition
of unverifiable information,” in Cooperative Information Agents XII
(M. Klusch, M. Pechoucek, and A. Polleres, eds.), vol. 5180 of LNCS,
pp. 41–54, Springer Verlag, 2008.
[18] E. Staab, V. Fusenig, and T. Engel, “Trust-aided acquisition of unveri-
fiable information,” in Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (ECAI ’08), pp. 869–870, IOS Press, 2008.
[19] D. Spiewak, V. Fusenig, and T. Engel, “The importance of location on
trust in mobile networks,” WESEAS Transactions on Communication,
vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 349–360, 2008.
[20] D. Spiewak, V. Fusenig, and T. Engel, “Trustrings in mobile wireless
network settings,” Proceedings of the INFORMATION SECURITY and
PRIVACY Conference 2007, Puerto de la Cruz, Spain, vol. 6, pp. 104–
110, December 2007.
[21] D. Spiewak, V. Fusenig, and T. Engel, “Mobility diversifies trust: Intro-
ducing trustrings,” in IEEE Wireless Telecommunications Symposium
(WTS 2007), April 26-28 2007, IEEE, IEEE, April 2007.
[22] D. Spiewak, T. Engel, and V. Fusenig, “Unmasking threats in mobile
wireless ad-hoc network settings,” WSEAS Transactions on Communi-
cations, Issue 1, vol. 6, pp. 104–110, January 2007.
[23] D. Spiewak, T. Engel, and V. Fusenig, “Towards a threat model for
mobile ad-hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the 5th Int.Conf. on IN-
FORMATION SECURITY and PRIVACY ”’ISP’06”’, November 20-
22, 2006, Venice, Italy, vol. 5, WSEAS, ISS, November 2006.
[24] U. Roth and V. Fusenig, “How certain is recommended trust-
information,” in Proceedings of the 15th International World Wide
Web Conference (WWW2006), Workshop Models of Trust for the Web
(MTW’06), May 22-26, 2006, Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2006.
[25] U. Roth and V. Fusenig, “Trust-decisions on the base of maximal infor-
mation of recommended direct-trust,” in Proceedings of the 2006 ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing 2006, ACM SAC 2006, 23-27. April
2006, Dijon, France, vol. 2, pp. 1898–1899, ACM, ACM, April 2006.
97
[26] H. Bauer, Maß- und Integrationstheorie. Gruyter, 1992.
[27] R. Johannesson, Informationstheorie. Grundlage der (Tele-) Kommu-
nikation. Addison Wesley Verlag, 1992.
[28] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. John
Wiley & sons, 1991.
[29] The Century Dictionary, The Century Dictionary. The Century Co.,
1911.
[30] A. Pfitzmann and M. Köhntopp, “Anonymity, unobservability, and
pseudonymity - a proposal for terminology,” in Workshop on Design
Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability (H. Federrath, ed.), vol. 2009
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 1–9, Springer, 2000.
[31] M. Autenrieth, “Unverzichtbarer Schutz gegen existenzielles Risiko,”
May 2008. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/finanzen/767/441508/
text/.
[32] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” Bell System
Technical Journal, vol. 28(4), pp. 656–715, 1948.
[33] A. Kerckhoffs, “La cryptographie militaire,” Journal des Sciences Mili-
taires, vol. IX, pp. 5–38, January 1883.
[34] A. Serjantov and P. Sewell, “Passive attack analysis for connection-based
anonymity systems,” in Proceedings of ESORICS 2003, October 2003.
[35] D. Dolev and A. C. Yao, “On the security of public key protocols,” tech.
rep., Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, 1981.
[36] D. Dolev and A. C. Yao, “On the security of public key protocols,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 198–208, 1983.
[37] D. Chaum, “Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 4, February 1981.
[38] D. Chaum, “The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender
and recipient untraceability,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1, pp. 65–75,
1988.
98
[39] A. Pfitzmann, A. Juschka, A.-K. Stange, S. Steinbrecher, and S. Köpsell,
“Communication privacy,” in Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies and
Practices, Elsevier, 2007.
[40] A. Jerichow, J. Müller, A. Pfitzmann, B. Pfitzmann, and M. Waidner,
“Real-Time MIXes: A Bandwidth-Efficient Anonymity Protocol,” IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 16, no. 4, 1998.
[41] C. Díaz and A. Serjantov, “Generalising mixes,” in Proceedings of Pri-
vacy Enhancing Technologies workshop (PET 2003), pp. 18–31, March
2003.
[42] G. Danezis, R. Dingledine, D. Hopwood, and N. Mathewson, “Mixmin-
ion: Design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol,” in In Proceed-
ings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 2–15,
2003.
[43] O. Berthold, H. Federrath, and S. Köpsell, “Web mixes: a system for
anonymous and unobservable internet access,” in International work-
shop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies, (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 115–129, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2001.
[44] D. M. Goldschlag, M. G. Reed, and P. F. Syverson, “Hiding Rout-
ing Information,” in Proceedings of Information Hiding: First Inter-
national Workshop (R. Anderson, ed.), pp. 137–150, Springer-Verlag,
LNCS 1174, May 1996.
[45] P. F. Syverson, D. M. Goldschlag, and M. G. Reed, “Anonymous con-
nections and onion routing,” in SP ’97: Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, (Washington, DC, USA), p. 44,
IEEE Computer Society, 1997.
[46] P. F. Syverson, M. G. Reed, and D. M. Goldschlag, “Private web brows-
ing,” J. Comput. Secur., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 237–248, 1997.
[47] P. F. Syverson, M. G. Reed, and D. M. Goldschlag, “Onion Routing
access configurations,” in DARPA Information Survivability Conference
and Exposition (DISCEX 2000), vol. 1, pp. 34–40, IEEE CS Press, 2000.
99
[48] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson, “Tor: the second-
generation onion router,” in SSYM’04: Proceedings of the 13th confer-
ence on USENIX Security Symposium, (Berkeley, CA, USA), pp. 21–21,
USENIX Association, August 2004.
[49] K. Bauer, D. McCoy, D. Grunwald, T. Kohno, and D. Sicker, “Low-
resource routing attacks against Tor,” in WPES ’07: Proceedings of the
2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in electronic society, (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 11–20, ACM, 2007.
[50] M. K. Wright, M. Adler, B. N. Levine, and C. Shields, “The predecessor
attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems,”
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 489–522, 2004.
[51] J. Bos and B. den Boer, “Detection of disrupters in the DC protocol,”
in EUROCRYPT ’89: Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and
application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology, (New
York, NY, USA), pp. 320–327, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 1990.
[52] A. Pfitzmann, “How to implement ISDNs without user observability -
some remarks,” SIGSAC Rev., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 19–21, 1987.
[53] M. Waidner, “Unconditional sender and recipient untraceability in spite
of active attacks,” in EUROCRYPT ’89: Proceedings of the workshop
on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances
in cryptology, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 302–319, Springer-Verlag New
York, Inc., 1990.
[54] C. Studholme and I. Blake, “Multiparty computation to generate secret
permutations.” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2007/353, 2007.
[55] M. Waidner and B. Pfitzmann, “The dining cryptographers in the disco:
unconditional sender and recipient untraceability with computationally
secure serviceability,” in EUROCRYPT ’89: Proceedings of the work-
shop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Ad-
vances in cryptology, (New York, NY, USA), p. 690, Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc., 1990.
[56] S. Goel, M. Robson, M. Polte, and E. G. Sirer, “Herbivore: A Scal-
able and Efficient Protocol for Anonymous Communication,” Tech. Rep.
2003-1890, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, February 2003.
100
[57] J. Kong and X. Hong, “ANODR: anonymous on-demand routing with
untraceable routes for mobile ad-hoc networks,” in MobiHoc ’03: Pro-
ceedings of the 4th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc
networking & computing, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 291–302, ACM
Press, 2003.
[58] O. Berthold, A. Pfitzmann, and R. Standtke, “The disadvantages of
free mix routes and how to overcome them,” in International workshop
on Designing privacy enhancing technologies, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 30–45, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2001.
[59] J.-F. Raymond, “Traffic analysis: protocols, attacks, design issues, and
open problems,” in Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Pro-
ceedings of International Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and
Unobservability (H. Federrath, ed.), vol. 2009 of LNCS, (New York, NY,
USA), pp. 10–29, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2001.
[60] S. M. Huffmann and M. H. Reifer, “Method for geolocating logical net-
work addresses.” Patent of the United States of America as represented
by the Director, National Security Agency, September 2005. Patent
Number: 6,947,978.
[61] M. Dusi, M. Crotti, F. Gringoli, and L. Salgarelli, “Tunnel hunter: De-
tecting application-layer tunnels with statistical fingerprinting,” Com-
put. Netw., vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 81–97, 2009.
[62] D. Agrawal and D. Kesdogan, “Measuring anonymity: The disclosure
attack,” IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 1, no. 6, pp. 27–34, 2003.
[63] D. Kesdogan, D. Agrawal, and S. Penz, “Limits of anonymity in open
environments,” in IH ’02: Revised Papers from the 5th International
Workshop on Information Hiding, (London, UK), pp. 53–69, Springer-
Verlag, 2003.
[64] S. Penz, “Security analysis and evaluation of anonymity techniques in
open environments,” Master’s thesis, Computer Science Department In-
formatik IV (Communication and Distributed Systems), Technical Uni-
versity of Aachen, 2002.
101
[65] D. Agrawal, D. Kesdogan, and S. Penz, “Probabilistic treatment of mixes
to hamper traffic analysis,” in SP ’03: Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy, (Washington, DC, USA), p. 16,
IEEE Computer Society, 2003.
[66] G. Danezis, “Statistical disclosure attacks: Traffic confirmation in open
environments,” in Proceedings of Security and Privacy in the Age of
Uncertainty, (SEC2003), (Athens), pp. 421–426, IFIP TC11, May 2003.
[67] D. Kesdogan and L. Pimenidis, “The hitting set attack on anonymity
protocols,” in Information Hiding (J. J. Fridrich, ed.), vol. 3200 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 326–339, Springer, 2004.
[68] N. Borisov, G. Danezis, P. Mittal, and P. Tabriz, “Denial of service or
denial of security?,” in CCS ’07: Proceedings of the 14th ACM confer-
ence on Computer and communications security, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 92–102, ACM, 2007.
[69] T. Dierks and E. Rescorla, “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Pro-
tocol Version 1.2.” RFC 5246 (Proposed Standard), Aug. 2008.
[70] A. Back, U. Möller, and A. Stiglic, “Traffic analysis attacks and trade-
offs in anonymity providing systems,” in IHW ’01: Proceedings of the 4th
International Workshop on Information Hiding, (London, UK), pp. 245–
257, Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[71] C. Gulcu and G. Tsudik, “Mixing email with Babel,” in SNDSS ’96:
Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Network and Distributed System
Security (SNDSS ’96), (Washington, DC, USA), p. 2, IEEE Computer
Society, 1996.
[72] A. Serjantov, R. Dingledine, and P. Syverson, “From a trickle to a flood:
Active attacks on several mix types,” in Proceedings of Information Hid-
ing Workshop (IH 2002) (F. Petitcolas, ed.), Springer-Verlag, LNCS
2578, October 2002.
[73] G. Danezis and L. Sassaman, “Heartbeat traffic to counter (n-1) attacks:
red-green-black mixes,” in WPES ’03: Proceedings of the 2003 ACM
workshop on Privacy in the electronic society, (New York, NY, USA),
pp. 89–93, ACM, 2003.
102
[74] X. Wang and D. S. Reeves, “Robust correlation of encrypted attack traf-
fic through stepping stones by manipulation of interpacket delays,” in
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 20–
29, 2003.
[75] X. Wang, S. Chen, and S. Jajodia, “Network flow watermarking attack
on low-latency anonymous communication systems,” in IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy, pp. 116–130, 2007.
[76] Y. J. Pyun, Y. H. Park, X. Wang, D. S. Reeves, and P. Ning, “Tracing
traffic through intermediate hosts that repacketize flows,” in INFOCOM,
pp. 634–642, IEEE, 2007.
[77] N. Kiyavash, A. Houmansadr, and N. Borisov, “Multi-flow attacks
against network flow watermarking schemes,” in USENIX Security Sym-
posium, pp. 307–320, USENIX, 2008.
[78] W. Dai, “Two attacks against freedom,” December 2008. http://www.
weidai.com/freedom-attacks.txt.
[79] P. Golle and A. Juels, “Dining cryptographers revisited,” in EURO-
CRYPT (C. Cachin and J. Camenisch, eds.), vol. 3027 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pp. 456–473, Springer, 2004.
[80] C. Franck, “New directions for dining cryptographers,” Master’s thesis,
University of Luxembourg, 2008.
[81] L. J. Bain and M. Engelhardt, Introduction to Probability and Mathe-
matical Statistics. Duxbury Press, 2nd, ed., 2000.
[82] B. N. Levine, M. K. Reiter, C. Wang, and M. K. Wright, “Timing at-
tacks in low-latency mix-based systems,” in Proceedings of Financial
Cryptography (FC ’04), pp. 251–265, February 2004.
[83] V. Paxson and S. Floyd, “Wide-area traffic: the failure of Poisson mod-
eling,” SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 257–268,
1994.
[84] C. J. V. Rijsbergen, Information Retrieval. Newton, MA, USA:
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1979.
103
[85] Y. Zhang, W. Liu, W. Lou, and Y. Fang, “MASK: Anonymous on-
demand routing in mobile ad hoc networks,” in Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 21, pp. 2376–2385, IEEE, 2006.
[86] S. Seys and B. Preneel, “ARM: Anonymous routing protocol for mobile
ad hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the 20th IEEE International Con-
ference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications - Work-
shops (AINA 2006 Workshops), (Vienna,AU), pp. 133–137, IEEE, 2006.
[87] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptography,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. IT-22, no. 6, pp. 644–654,
1976.
[88] P. R. Zimmermann, The official PGP user’s guide. Cambridge, MA,
USA: MIT Press, 1995.
[89] V. Rijmen and J. Daemen, The Design of Rijndael: AES. The Advanced
Encryption Standard. Springer, Berlin, 2002.
[90] A. J. Menezes, P. C. van Oorschot, and S. A. Vanstone, Handbook of
Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 2001.
[91] Unitymedia, “Internet, Telefon und TV,” March 2009. http://www.
unitymedia.de/.
[92] IEEE, IEEE Standard for Information technology - Telecommunications
and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area
networks - Specific requirements; Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Ac-
cess Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications. IEEE
Computer Society, June), year = 2007.
[93] T. Scherer and T. Engel, “Bandwidth consumption for providing fair
internet access in wireless mesh networks,” in The 2006 IEEE Inter-
national Workshop on Wireless Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks (IWWAN
2006), June 2006.
[94] E. W. Dijkstra, “A note on two problems in connexion with graphs,”
Numerische Mathematik, vol. 1, pp. 269–271, 1959.
[95] “JAP Anon Proxy,” February 2009. http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.
de/.
104
[96] C. Wright, S. Coull, and F. Monrose, “Traffic morphing: An efficient
defense against statistical traffic analysis,” in Proceedings of the Network
and Distributed Security Symposium - NDSS ’09, IEEE, February 2009.
[97] L. Buttyán and J.-P. Hubaux, “Stimulating cooperation in self-
organizing mobile ad hoc networks,” Mob. Netw. Appl., vol. 8, no. 5,
pp. 579–592, 2003.
[98] M. Feldman and J. Chuang, “Overcoming free-riding behavior in peer-
to-peer systems,” SIGecom Exch., vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 41–50, 2005.
105
